Executive assessment
The present Kuki–Naga confrontation cannot be explained by a single incident or by saying that one community simply “started” the conflict.
The evidence points to five overlapping historical drivers:
- Competing territorial claims — particularly in Senapati, Kangpokpi, Ukhrul, Tamenglong/Noney and Chandel.
- Competing ethnic-nationalist projects — the Naga demand for integration of contiguous Naga-inhabited areas and the Kuki demand for a Kuki homeland/separate administration.
- The unresolved legacy of the 1992–97 Naga–Kuki war, including killings, village destruction and mass displacement.
- The proliferation of armed organisations and competing ceasefire arrangements, particularly NSCN-IM on the Naga side and Kuki armed organisations under the Suspension of Operations (SoO).
- The collapse of inter-community trust after the 2023 Meitei–Kuki war, which altered the strategic balance in the hills and brought previously contained Naga–Kuki disputes back to the centre.
Academic literature broadly identifies identity, land and competing territorial nationalism as the structural causes. One study concludes that the conflict was driven by an unresolved identity problem, land disputes and inadequate state responses; another review identifies colonial administrative policies and post-independence ethnic nationalism as important roots, while finding that competing land and territorial claims became the principal continuing source of tension.
1. The deepest roots: before the 1990s
1917–1919: Kuki Rebellion and the colonial restructuring of hill politics
The Kuki–Naga relationship predates the modern conflict. British administration categorised and administered the hill populations through different systems, reinforcing distinctions between communities that had previously interacted through a much more fluid network of villages, clans, trade and warfare.
The Kuki Rebellion of 1917–19 was directed primarily against British attempts to impose labour and wartime obligations. It became an important part of subsequent Kuki political memory.
At the same time, the British system of indirect administration, village boundaries and ethnographic classification contributed to the later development of distinct political identities. Scholars have therefore treated colonial governance as one of the historical roots rather than identifying a single ancient “Kuki versus Naga” war.
Why this matters today
Both sides developed historical narratives about who was indigenous to particular hills and villages. Those narratives later became politically important when modern organisations began demanding exclusive territorial rights.
2. 1947–1980s: ethnic nationalism becomes territorial politics
After Independence, the Naga political movement developed into a demand for a separate Naga political entity encompassing Naga-inhabited areas beyond present-day Nagaland.
This became particularly important for Manipur because significant Naga-inhabited areas lie inside the state.
The emergence of the Naga National Council and later NSCN, followed by the rise of NSCN-IM, transformed ethnic identity into a territorial question.
Kuki political mobilisation subsequently developed its own territorial aspirations, including demands associated with Kukiland/Kuki homeland.
This produced a fundamental geographical problem:
The territories claimed in competing Naga and Kuki political projects substantially overlap.
Research specifically identifies Chandel, Senapati, Tamenglong and Ukhrul as areas where the two communities have developed competing territorial claims.
3. 1992: the conflict turns into war
The critical turning point
The Naga–Kuki conflict escalated into sustained armed violence in 1992.
Several factors converged:
- disputes over land and village jurisdiction;
- competing claims over areas considered Naga or Kuki;
- demands for taxes/levies by armed organisations;
- competition over resources;
- control of roads and trade routes;
- the wider Naga political movement;
- emergence of Kuki armed groups;
- growing ethnic mobilisation.
The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses records that the 1992–94 clashes occurred against the backdrop of rivalry over land, political territory and issues including alleged demands by NSCN-IM for taxes from Kuki inhabitants.
Human Rights Watch later described the Naga–Kuki clashes of the 1990s as involving hundreds of deaths, village destruction and the displacement of large numbers of people.
4. 13 September 1993 — Joupi massacre
This remains the single most important historical event in Kuki collective memory of the Naga–Kuki conflict.
On 13 September 1993, large numbers of Kuki civilians were killed around Joupi/Senapati. Kuki organisations traditionally commemorate the date as Black Day. The exact casualty figure varies between sources. An MP-IDSA account records 88 Kukis killed, while other historical timelines report approximately 90.
Kuki narrative
The dominant Kuki interpretation is:
NSCN-IM and Naga armed groups launched a campaign to drive Kukis out of territories claimed as Naga.
This narrative is reinforced by the large-scale displacement and destruction of Kuki villages.
Naga narrative
The Naga interpretation places the violence within the broader context of:
- Kuki armed-group expansion;
- competing territorial claims;
- attacks on Naga civilians;
- attempts to establish a Kuki political homeland in areas claimed by Nagas.
The important point is that both communities developed a collective memory of victimhood. That is one of the reasons the conflict never truly ended psychologically even after the guns fell silent.
5. 1993–1997: ethnic cleansing, displacement and armed consolidation
The violence spread across the hill districts.
Human Rights Watch later cited Kuki accounts alleging that more than 900 people were killed and over 350 villages uprooted, although casualty and displacement figures vary substantially between sources and community records.
Academic literature generally places the total deaths of the 1990s conflict at more than 1,000, with hundreds of villages destroyed and tens of thousands displaced.
The demographic consequence
One of the most consequential effects was the concentration of displaced Kukis in areas such as Churachandpur, while many Kuki settlements disappeared from areas subsequently dominated by Naga communities. That changed the geography of the hills and this created a vicious cycle:
violence → displacement → demographic change → competing territorial claims → renewed insecurity.
6. 1997: Naga ceasefire — but not a Kuki–Naga settlement
The Government of India and NSCN-IM entered a ceasefire in August 1997. This was a major turning point in the Naga insurgency but not a peace agreement between Nagas and Kukis. That distinction is critical.
The ceasefire stopped much of the large-scale Naga–Kuki warfare, but it did not settle:
- ownership of disputed land;
- displaced Kuki claims;
- return of refugees;
- village boundaries;
- customary authority;
- competing homeland demands;
- political status of Naga-inhabited Manipur;
- Kuki political aspirations.
Academic research specifically notes that although hostilities formally ceased in 1997, the underlying conflict remained because the identity and territorial questions were never resolved.
7. 1997–2001: a temporary equilibrium
For several years, the situation was relatively contained. But a much larger political issue was developing. The Naga peace process increasingly raised the possibility of a settlement covering Naga-inhabited areas outside Nagaland. This immediately affected Manipur's territorial politics.
8. 14 June 2001 — the “without territorial limits” crisis
The Centre and NSCN-IM extended their ceasefire to “all Naga-inhabited areas” without territorial limitation. This triggered massive protests in Manipur. The Meitei community feared the arrangement could facilitate the creation of a larger Naga political entity incorporating parts of Manipur.
The protests culminated on 18 June 2001, when the Manipur Assembly complex was burned and people were killed in security-force firing. The Centre subsequently withdrew the controversial territorial wording. Why this matters to the Kuki–Naga relationship,
The 2001 crisis reinforced a new reality:
The Naga political question was no longer merely an Naga–Kuki issue. It became a question involving the territorial integrity of Manipur itself. Kukis, Meiteis and Nagas therefore increasingly became involved in overlapping territorial and political calculations.
9. 2000s–2010s: conflict becomes “frozen”, not resolved
The absence of large-scale Kuki–Naga warfare created the appearance of peace. But underneath were unresolved issues:
Naga concerns
- Kuki settlement in traditionally Naga-claimed areas;
- Kuki political demands;
- alleged encroachment;
- presence of Kuki armed groups;
- competing claims over customary land;
- potential fragmentation of Naga territories.
Kuki concerns
- fear of another 1990s-style campaign;
- loss of ancestral villages;
- absence of a political settlement;
- lack of recognition of Kuki territorial aspirations;
- continued Naga political claims over areas where Kukis live.
The academic literature describes this as a frozen conflict rather than a resolved conflict.
10. 2015 — Framework Agreement
On 3 August 2015, the Government of India and NSCN-IM signed the Framework Agreement. The exact contents have not been fully made public, which itself has generated controversy. NSCN-IM continues to interpret the agreement as recognising the “unique history” and political rights of the Nagas and continues to insist on integration of contiguous Naga areas. In 2025, NSCN-IM leadership again described territory and integration of Naga areas as non-negotiable.
Kuki interpretation
For many Kuki organisations, the unresolved Naga settlement remains a potential threat because any territorial arrangement involving Naga-inhabited areas could affect Kuki settlements and political claims. Thus, even without active warfare, the 2015 agreement kept territorial anxiety alive.
11. 2023 — the conflict changes fundamentally
The May 2023 crisis was primarily a Meitei–Kuki conflict, not a Kuki–Naga war. But it profoundly altered the Naga–Kuki equation. The immediate political trigger was the controversy surrounding Scheduled Tribe status for the Meitei community and the Manipur High Court's direction concerning consideration of the demand. Kuki and Naga organisations opposed the move, fearing consequences for tribal land protection, reservation and political representation.
On 3 May 2023, widespread violence erupted.
What followed
- Meiteis became concentrated in the valley.
- Kuki-Zo populations became concentrated in the hills.
- Thousands were displaced.
- Large areas effectively became ethnically segregated.
- Armed groups became increasingly important.
- The state security apparatus became deeply distrusted by both sides.
By June 2024, Reuters reported more than 220 deaths and around 60,000 displaced from the wider Meitei–Kuki conflict.
12. Why 2023 indirectly reignited Kuki–Naga tensions
This is perhaps the most important development for understanding the current situation. Before 2023, Naga–Kuki tensions existed but were comparatively contained.
After 2023: Kuki areas became politically and militarily consolidated. Kuki armed organisations operating under the SoO framework became more important.
Meanwhile, Naga communities increasingly worried that:
- Kuki settlements were expanding into areas they regard as Naga ancestral territory;
- Kuki-controlled routes were being developed;
- SoO camps could become permanent;
- post-war displacement could produce permanent demographic changes;
- Kuki political demands might eventually overlap with Naga territory.
These concerns became particularly visible in 2025.
13. 2025 — the territorial faultline returns
One major flashpoint was the controversy surrounding the Tiger Road/German Road connecting Kuki-Zo areas. Naga organisations argued that the road passed through or affected land they regarded as Naga ancestral territory and had been developed without adequate consent. They also opposed the establishment or relocation of Kuki SoO camps near Naga areas.
In July 2025, the Foothills Naga Coordination Committee announced an indefinite bandh over three principal issues:
- the Tiger/German Road;
- Kuki SoO camps;
- alleged poppy cultivation.
This is a crucial transition
The conflict was moving away from the old 1990s question:
“Who attacked whom?”
toward a newer question:
“Who controls which territory after 2023?”
14. February 2026 — the new Naga–Kuki conflict begins
This is the immediate beginning of the current phase.
7 February 2026 — Litan
A confrontation occurred at Litan Sareikhong in Ukhrul district involving Tangkhul Nagas and members of the Kuki community. Police described the immediate trigger as a brawl involving a Tangkhul Naga man who was allegedly assaulted. But the incident did not remain a local dispute.
8–9 February 2026 — houses burned
The confrontation escalated.
More than 20 houses were reportedly burned in Litan, and authorities imposed restrictions to prevent further violence.
Naga and Kuki narratives subsequently diverged sharply over:
- who initiated the confrontation;
- whether the original incident was spontaneous or organised;
- whether the destruction was retaliatory;
- the role of armed groups;
- whether the violence represented a broader territorial campaign.
This is the beginning of the 2026 Naga–Kuki blame cycle.
15. March–April 2026: conflict spreads
The February violence did not remain confined to Litan. The underlying issues increasingly involved:
- movement of civilians;
- road access;
- territorial boundaries;
- alleged armed-group presence;
- Kuki settlements;
- Naga claims over foothill areas;
- retaliation for earlier attacks.
The significance of Litan was therefore not the scale of the initial incident but the fact that it activated the unresolved 1990s memory in a post-2023 environment.
16. 13 May 2026 — three Kuki-Zo church leaders killed
A major escalation occurred on 13 May 2026 when three Kuki-Zo church leaders were killed in an ambush in Kangpokpi district. Several others were wounded. The attack was followed by accusations and retaliatory actions involving both communities. This became the immediate precursor to the most serious Naga–Kuki hostage crisis of 2026.
17. May 2026 — hostage crisis
Following the May 13 killings, civilians from both communities were abducted. The crisis eventually involved dozens of hostages. Naga organisations alleged that six Naga men had been abducted by Kuki groups. Kuki groups denied responsibility or said they had released those being held.
Meanwhile, Naga groups held Kuki civilians. The Indian Express reported that 14 Kuki men were eventually released by Naga groups on 9 June, while the fate of the six missing Naga men remained unresolved at that stage.
18. 10 June 2026 — six Naga men found dead
- The six missing Naga men were subsequently found dead.
- Their bodies were recovered on 10 June after weeks of uncertainty.
- The killings became the single most important event in the new Naga–Kuki conflict.
- The incident transformed the political narrative from:
territorial dispute → hostage crisis → alleged mass killing.
The case subsequently came under investigation involving Manipur Police, NIA and CRPF; two people were arrested in July in connection with the killings.
19. June 2026 — retaliation
The discovery of the six bodies was followed by attacks against Kuki civilians. Reuters reported that at least two Kuki people were killed in attacks on 11 June, immediately after the bodies of the six Naga men were recovered. This demonstrated the classic conflict mechanism:
attack → retaliation → counter-retaliation → collective blame.
20. June–July 2026: competing political narratives
The two communities increasingly framed the conflict differently.
Naga narrative
The core Naga argument became:
Kuki armed groups are attacking Naga civilians and attempting to expand Kuki territorial control into Naga ancestral areas.
Naga organisations increasingly demanded:
- action against Kuki armed groups;
- dismantling of Kuki SoO camps in Naga areas;
- protection of Naga villages;
- investigation of the six Naga killings;
- restriction of Kuki movement in certain Naga-majority areas.
Kuki narrative
The Kuki argument increasingly became:
Kuki civilians are being targeted because Naga organisations and armed groups want to push Kukis out of strategically important areas.
Kuki organisations also pointed to:
- attacks on Kuki villages;
- killings of Kuki civilians;
- burning of houses;
- restrictions on Kuki movement;
- the threat posed by NSCN-IM;
- the historical trauma of the 1990s.
In July, Kuki-Zo representatives also sought outside intervention and argued that their community had suffered attacks from NSCN-IM and other actors.
21. August 2026 — violence reaches another level
The conflict escalated again in late August.
On 27 August, four Liangmai Naga civilians were killed in an ambush along the Imphal–Tamenglong road in Kangpokpi district. Their bodies were recovered the following day.
This was followed by further attacks on Kuki villages.
On 31 August, three Kuki villagers, including two women, were killed at N. Teikhang, with houses reportedly burned.
Thus, within days: Naga civilians killed → Kuki civilians killed → renewed mobilisation.
22. September 2026 — the blame game becomes institutionalised
The conflict has now moved beyond village-level retaliation into formal political confrontation.
Naga MLAs' allegations
Eight of the nine Naga MLAs in the Manipur Assembly wrote to Union Home Minister Amit Shah alleging attacks by Kuki-Zo leaders and militant groups.
They called for:
- arrests of Kuki-Zo leaders allegedly connected to the killings;
- action against specific Kuki militant leaders;
- action against Deputy Chief Minister Nemcha Kipgen over alleged links to Kuki militants;
- termination of the SoO arrangement with Kuki militant groups.
These are allegations by the Naga legislators, not judicial findings.
Kuki counter-response
The Kuki Inpi Manipur subsequently submitted a counter-memorandum to the Union Home Minister rejecting what it called unfounded allegations and calling for:
- independent investigations;
- balanced accountability;
- a political rather than purely security-based solution.
The Kuki-Zo Council has similarly rejected the framing of the conflict as simply Kuki aggression and has accused the political system of failing to protect Kuki-Zo communities.
23. Where the blame narratives currently stand
| Issue | Naga narrative | Kuki narrative | What can actually be established |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1990s war | Kuki expansion/armed groups contributed to conflict | NSCN-IM drove Kukis from villages | Large-scale inter-ethnic warfare occurred; exact responsibility varies by incident |
| Joupi 1993 | Context of wider armed conflict | NSCN-IM massacre of Kuki civilians | Major massacre occurred; perpetrator attribution remains contested in broader historical discourse |
| Territorial claims | Kuki encroachment into Naga ancestral land | Naga attempt to monopolise areas where Kukis have lived | Overlapping territorial claims are a documented structural cause |
| SoO camps | Security threat/territorial expansion | Protected locations necessary for Kuki armed groups and communities | Their location has become a major territorial dispute |
| Tiger/German Road | Road through Naga ancestral territory | Security/connectivity corridor between Kuki areas | Dispute reflects competing territorial claims |
| February 2026 | Kuki attack triggered Litan crisis | Localised incident subsequently politicised | Initial assault and subsequent arson are reported; broader attribution requires investigation |
| May 2026 | Kuki side linked to attacks/hostage-taking | Kuki church leaders were attacked first | Three Kuki church leaders were killed on May 13; subsequent hostage-taking occurred |
| Six Naga deaths | Kuki armed groups responsible | Responsibility was initially denied/disputed | Bodies were recovered; investigation and arrests followed |
| August 2026 Naga deaths | Kuki militants responsible | Kuki groups dispute/contest attribution | Four Naga civilians were killed; attribution remains an allegation |
| Kuki village attacks | Retaliatory/defensive action | Naga militants attacking civilians | Three Kuki civilians were killed and houses burned; perpetrators require investigation |
24. The real root causes
If the question is “Why does this keep returning?”, I would reduce the answer to six structural problems.
1. Territory
This is probably the deepest issue. Nagas and Kukis do not merely compete for political influence. Their territorial imaginaries overlap. That makes ordinary settlement, road construction, administration and demographic change politically explosive. Academic research identifies land and territory as the principal continuing source of tension.
2. Two competing nationalisms
The Naga movement seeks recognition of a distinct Naga political identity and has historically pursued integration of contiguous Naga areas. Kuki political movements have developed their own homeland/separate-administration aspirations. Both projects therefore potentially require territorial consolidation. That is structurally difficult when populations are intermixed.
3. The 1990s never received a genuine reconciliation process
There was no comprehensive Kuki–Naga settlement addressing:
- victims;
- missing people;
- destroyed villages;
- land;
- return of displaced people;
- compensation;
- memorialisation;
- customary rights;
- political guarantees.
The guns largely stopped. The historical dispute did not.
4. Armed organisations became political actors
NSCN-IM's role in the Naga political process and Kuki militant organisations' participation in SoO have created a situation where community security and militant power are difficult to separate.
This creates a dangerous perception:
An armed group's territorial presence is interpreted as the community's territorial claim.
5. 2023 fundamentally changed the geography
The Meitei–Kuki war produced unprecedented separation between communities. Kuki areas became more politically and militarily consolidated.
The post-2023 environment therefore created new fears among Naga communities about Kuki expansion into Naga areas, while Kuki communities became more dependent on territorial corridors for security. This is why the Tiger Road, SoO camps and foothill areas have become so sensitive.
6. Absence of trusted neutral institutions
Perhaps the most dangerous factor is that both sides increasingly distrust the state.
Each community believes:
“The government protects the other side.”
Once that perception takes hold, every new killing is interpreted not as an isolated crime but as evidence of a broader conspiracy. That is how a local incident becomes an ethnic conflict.
25. The 2026 conflict is not simply “1990s Part II”
There is an important difference.
1990s
- The principal dynamic was:
- Naga nationalist armed movement ↔ Kuki armed groups
- with large-scale village displacement.
2026
The dynamic is more complicated:
And it is taking place on top of the unresolved 2023 Meitei–Kuki war. That makes the present conflict potentially more difficult to contain than the 1990s conflict.
26. The most dangerous current faultline
The most dangerous issue is no longer simply:
“Who killed whom?”
It is:
Who will control the strategic foothills and transport corridors after the 2023 conflict?
The disputes around:
- Kangpokpi,
- Senapati,
- Makhan,
- Kanglatongbi,
- Litan,
- Leilon Vaiphei,
- the Imphal–Tamenglong road,
- Tiger/German Road,
- SoO camps,
all point toward the same underlying problem:
territorial insecurity.
The recent Naga opposition to Kuki SoO camps and roads, for example, explicitly frames these developments as threats to Naga ancestral territory.
27. Timeline at a glance
| Period | Event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| 1917–19 | Kuki Rebellion | Important formation of Kuki political memory |
| 1947–80s | Naga nationalism grows | Territorial question develops |
| 1960s–80s | Kuki political mobilisation grows | Competing homeland politics emerge |
| 1992 | Naga–Kuki war begins | Conflict becomes armed and territorial |
| 13 Sept 1993 | Joupi massacre | Defining Kuki historical trauma |
| 1993–97 | Widespread ethnic violence | Villages destroyed; mass displacement |
| 1997 | NSCN-IM–India ceasefire | Naga insurgency enters political process |
| 1997–2001 | Relative Naga–Kuki calm | Conflict becomes frozen rather than resolved |
| 2001 | “Without territorial limits” ceasefire crisis | Manipur's territorial integrity becomes central |
| 2015 | Framework Agreement | Naga political settlement remains unresolved |
| 3 May 2023 | Meitei–Kuki war begins | Completely transforms hill politics |
| 2024 | Conflict continues | Ethnic segregation deepens |
| 2025 | Tiger Road/SoO controversy | Naga–Kuki territorial dispute resurfaces |
| 7 Feb 2026 | Litan incident | Immediate trigger of current Naga–Kuki phase |
| 8–9 Feb | Houses burned at Litan | Local conflict expands |
| 13 May | Three Kuki church leaders killed | Major escalation |
| May–June | Hostage crisis | Civilians become bargaining instruments |
| 10 June | Six Naga men found dead | Conflict escalates dramatically |
| June–July | Retaliatory violence | Naga–Kuki conflict becomes entrenched |
| 27–28 Aug | Four Naga civilians killed | Major late-August escalation |
| 31 Aug | Three Kuki civilians killed | Retaliatory cycle continues |
| 1–3 Sept | Political confrontation | Naga MLAs vs Kuki leadership |
| 4 Sept | HRW warns of renewed violence | International human-rights concern |
| 7 Sept | Further violence/arson reported | Conflict remains active |
Human Rights Watch reported on 4 September that at least 34 people had been killed in Naga–Kuki violence since February 2026, including seven in late August alone.
28. My assessment: who is responsible?
It would be analytically weak to conclude:
“The Nagas are responsible.”
or
“The Kukis are responsible.”
The historical evidence supports a more complicated conclusion. Responsibility exists at three different levels:
Level 1 — Individual crimes
Specific killings, abductions, arson and attacks should be attributed to specific perpetrators through investigation and courts.
Level 2 — Armed organisations
NSCN-IM and Kuki armed groups have to be examined independently of the civilian populations they claim to represent.
Level 3 — Political structures
The larger responsibility lies in the failure of successive governments and political actors to resolve:
- land;
- boundaries;
- displacement;
- customary authority;
- competing political aspirations;
- armed-group accountability.
This distinction is crucial because collective punishment of Nagas or Kukis will only reproduce the same conflict.
29. The central paradox
The most striking feature of the Kuki–Naga conflict is this:
Both communities see themselves as historically threatened and therefore believe territorial consolidation is necessary for survival.
But when one community consolidates territory for security, the other interprets that consolidation as aggression.
That creates a classic security dilemma:
Naga insecurity → Naga territorial mobilisation → Kuki insecurity → Kuki territorial mobilisation → Naga insecurity → armed mobilisation → retaliation → displacement → new territorial claims.
And the cycle repeats.
Bottom line
The 1992–97 war is the original wound.
The 2001 Naga ceasefire crisis demonstrated the political danger of territorial ambiguity.
The 2015 Framework Agreement kept the Naga territorial question alive.
The 2023 Meitei–Kuki war transformed the geography and security structure of Manipur.
The 2025 road/SoO disputes brought Naga–Kuki territorial competition back to the surface.
And February–September 2026 has converted that dormant competition into renewed armed ethnic confrontation.
So the present Kuki–Naga “blame game” is not the cause of the conflict; it is a symptom of a much older unresolved territorial and political conflict.
The most important question for Manipur is therefore not “Which community is guilty?” but:
Can Nagas and Kukis agree on a political and territorial framework in which neither community's security requires the displacement, exclusion or political subordination of the other?
Without addressing that question, every new killing will continue to be interpreted through the memory of 1993, the territorial anxieties of 2001, the unresolved politics of 2015, and the ethnic separation created by 2023.
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References
Academic and analytical sources
Doungel, T., Purkayastha, S., & Haokip, T. L. (2025). Ethnic tensions and displacement: The Kuki-Naga conflict and the redistribution of Kuki communities in Manipur, India. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/394435934_Ethnic_Tensions_and_Displacement_The_Kuki-_Naga_Conflict_and_the_Redistribution_of_Kuki_Communities_in_Manipur_India
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. (2023, December 21). Understanding the complex conflict unfolding in Manipur. IWGIA. https://iwgia.org/en/news/5329-understanding-complex-conflict-unfolding-manipur.html
Ziviler Friedensdienst. (2022). Interrogating peace: The Naga–Kuki conflict in Manipur. https://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/sites/default/files/media/file/2022/zfd-friedensinseln-1159_9.pdf
International Crisis Group. (2025, February 14). Finding a way out of festering conflict in India's Manipur. Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/asia/south-asia/india/346-finding-way-out-festering-conflict-indias-manipur
Human-rights and international sources
Human Rights Watch. (2023, May 30). India: Investigate police bias alleged in Manipur violence. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/30/india-investigate-police-bias-alleged-manipur-violence
Human Rights Watch. (2023, June 30). Ethnic violence spirals in India's northeastern Manipur state. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/30/ethnic-violence-spirals-indias-northeastern-manipur-state
Human Rights Watch. (2026). World report 2026: India. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/india
Human Rights Watch. (2026, September 4). India: Renewed ethnic violence in Manipur. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/09/03/india-renewed-ethnic-violence-in-manipur
Contemporary reporting — 2025–2026
Das Gupta, M., & Bhardwaj, A. (2026, May 25). Manipur: Why Naga-Kuki clashes raising fresh concerns. ThePrint. https://theprint.in/politics/the-new-fault-line-in-manipur-inside-growing-naga-kuki-conflict-why-its-worrying-security-agencies/2940134/
Indian Express. (2026, September). Manipur Naga MLAs write to Amit Shah, seek “bold action” to check attacks on community members. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/manipur-naga-mlas-letter-amit-shah-kuki-militants-nemcha-kipgen-10857549/
Indian Express. (2026, September). Two women among three Kukis gunned down in Manipur. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/two-women-among-three-kukis-gunned-down-in-manipur-10857853/
Indian Express. (2026, September). ‘Is NRC a strategy against Kuki-Zos?’: Kuki-Zo Council on Manipur’s new fault line. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/manipur-kuki-zo-council-opposes-nrc-before-census-2027-presidents-rule-ginza-vualzong-10862168/
ThePrint. (2026, May 25). Manipur: Why Naga-Kuki clashes raising fresh concerns. ThePrint.
Reuters. (2026). Two killed in attacks by armed men in India’s restive Manipur state, police say. Reuters.
Historical conflict sources
Human Rights Watch. (2008). “This alien legacy”: The origins of the ethnic conflict in Manipur. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/india0908/india0908.htm
This is particularly useful for the 1990s Naga–Kuki conflict, displacement, village destruction and competing accounts of responsibility.
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. (n.d.). Naga peace accord and the Kuki and Meitei insurgencies in Manipur. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. https://www.idsa.in/
Current 2026 developments
Human Rights Watch. (2026, September 4). India: Renewed ethnic violence in Manipur. Human Rights Watch.
Indian Express. (2026, September). Two women among three Kukis gunned down in Manipur. The Indian Express.
Indian Express. (2026, September). Manipur Naga MLAs write to Amit Shah, seek “bold action” to check attacks on community members. The Indian Express.
Ukhrul Times. (2026, June 28). Naga Lawyers Association, Manipur holds first General Body Meeting in Imphal. Ukhrul Times.
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