Reassessing the Suspension of Operations (SoO) with Kuki Armed Groups (Presentation)

The Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement between the Government of India, the Government of Manipur, and Kuki armed organisations has functioned as a conflict-management framework rather than a conflict-resolution mechanism. While it reduced insurgent violence and created a dialogue platform, it has not produced a final political settlement after nearly two decades.

The post-2023 ethnic conflict has further strained the legitimacy and functionality of the SoO. A strategic reset is required to move from ceasefire maintenance → structured political settlement.

1. Policy Context

• Initiated mid-2000s to bring Kuki insurgent groups into negotiation.

• Formalised into a tripartite mechanism with:

  • Union Government

  • State Government

  • Kuki militant umbrella organisations

• Objectives:

  • Cease hostilities

  • Camp confinement and monitoring

  • Political dialogue

  • Gradual rehabilitation

2. Key Achievements

2.1 Security stabilisation

• Reduced open confrontation between militants and state forces.

• Prevented expansion of insurgency into full-scale armed conflict.

2.2 Political channel creation

• Institutionalised dialogue between insurgents and the state.

• Moderated demands from secessionist positions toward autonomy models.

2.3 Reintegration mechanisms

• Camps, stipends, and monitoring created partial demobilisation conditions.

3. Structural Weaknesses

3.1 Absence of final political roadmap

• Talks continue without a defined end-state (statehood, UT, autonomy council).

3.2 Militarised equilibrium

• Armed groups remain intact; demobilisation incomplete.

3.3 Ethnic asymmetry

• Perception of SoO as benefiting one ethnic bloc has triggered political backlash.

3.4 Federal divergence

• State and Centre have differed on continuation and scope of the agreement.

3.5 Governance distortions

• Designated camps sometimes function as local power centres.

4. Post-2023 Crisis: Strategic Implications

The Manipur ethnic violence fundamentally altered SoO dynamics:

• Ceasefire credibility weakened.

• Civil society polarised around continuation vs termination.

• Political demands hardened (separate administration / UT).

• Risk of militant fragmentation increased.

Policy conclusion: The SoO is now embedded in a broader ethnic conflict, not merely insurgency management.

5. Strategic Options for Government

Option A: Status-quo continuation

• Annual renewal, limited negotiation.

Pros: Stability, minimal disruption

Cons: Entrenched armed structures, no resolution

Option B: Structured political settlement (recommended)

• Time-bound negotiations with defined institutional outcome:

  • Territorial Council

  • Asymmetric federal arrangement

  • Administrative autonomy

Pros: Long-term stability

Cons: Political resistance, constitutional complexity

Option C: Demobilisation-first approach

• Disarmament, rehabilitation, integration before political settlement.

Pros: Security control

Cons: Likely rejection by armed groups

Option D: Multilateral peace architecture

• Include Meitei, Naga, and Kuki actors in a single negotiation framework.

Pros: Addresses ethnic competition

Cons: Politically difficult, time-intensive

6. Recommended Policy Roadmap (2026–2030)

Phase 1: Stabilisation

• Reaffirm ceasefire

• Independent monitoring mechanism

• Prevent camp militarisation

Phase 2: Political Framework

• Define negotiation end-state

• Constitutional working group

Phase 3: Demobilisation

• Gradual disarmament

• Skill and livelihood reintegration

Phase 4: Institutional Settlement

• Territorial governance model

• Fiscal autonomy provisions

7. Risk Assessment

Risk	Probability	Impact
Collapse of SoO	Medium	High
Ethnic escalation	High	High
Militant fragmentation	Medium	High
Federal political conflict	High	Medium

8. Policy Insight

The SoO must evolve from “ceasefire administration” to “political settlement architecture.”

Without a constitutional outcome, the agreement risks becoming a permanent conflict-management instrument.

HISTORICAL TIMELINE

Suspension of Operations (SoO), 2005–2026

2005

• Initial discussions between Government of India and Kuki militant groups.

• Framework for ceasefire explored.

2006–2007

• Negotiation of ground rules, camp arrangements, and monitoring structures.

2008

• Formal tripartite SoO agreement operationalised.

• Designated camps established; cadres brought under ceasefire.

2009–2012

• Annual renewals.

• Political dialogue begins around autonomy demands.

2013–2016

• Demand shifts from separate state to territorial council-type arrangements.

• Continued ceasefire stability.

2017–2020

• Negotiations intensify intermittently.

• Internal consolidation among Kuki umbrella organisations.

2021–2022

• Stagnation phase.

• Limited progress toward final settlement.

May 2023

• Ethnic violence erupts in Manipur.

• SoO framework enters crisis mode.

2023–2024

• State government questions continuation.

• Ceasefire violations alleged by multiple sides.

2025

• Revised SoO discussions and extensions.

• Talks include demands for Union Territory / separate administration.

2026

• SoO remains operational but politically contested.

• Future direction dependent on:

  • constitutional negotiations

  • ethnic reconciliation

  • Centre–state coordination

Analytical Conclusion

• Phase I (2005–2012): Ceasefire formation and insurgency containment
• Phase II (2013–2020): Political bargaining and autonomy discourse
• Phase III (2021–2026): Stagnation, ethnic crisis, and renegotiation

The SoO has transitioned from a security instrument → political bargaining mechanism → contested ethnic governance framework.

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Should the general public initiate the future of the SoO?

1) Why public involvement is necessary

(a) The SoO affects civilians most

• Displacement, security presence, ethnic segregation, and governance gaps are experienced by ordinary people - not negotiators.

• Any final settlement without public legitimacy will collapse.

(b) Peace processes succeed only with social buy-in

Global conflict studies show:

• Elite agreements without community acceptance fail.

• Public consultation stabilises ceasefires and transitions.

(c) Preventing narrative capture

If the public remains silent:

• Militants define the agenda.

• Political actors monopolise the discourse.

• Polarisation deepens.

2) But should the public “initiate” the SoO’s future?

Direct initiation by the masses is risky.

Risks of unstructured public activism:

• Emotional mobilisation → ethnic polarisation

• Street politics → hardening of militant positions

• Misinformation → collapse of negotiation space

Peace processes require:

• confidentiality

• phased negotiation

• institutional dialogue

These cannot be crowd-driven.

3) The correct role: Active but structured participation

The public should neither remain silent nor dominate negotiations.

Instead, they should act as legitimising stakeholders.

Constructive roles:

1. Civil society consultation

• Community forums

• academic institutions

• church bodies, student groups, women’s networks

2. Accountability pressure

Public can demand:

• transparency of ground rules

• non-militarisation of camps

• protection of civilians

3. Peace constituency formation

Public discourse must shift from:

• “Which community wins?”
  to

• “How does peace become sustainable?”

4. Inclusive dialogue demand

People can push government to include:

• Meitei, Naga, Kuki voices

• valley–hill representation

• youth and displaced communities

4) Why silence is dangerous

Public silence historically leads to:

• elite capture of negotiations

• underground power consolidation

• radicalisation of younger populations

• distrust of final settlement

Silence ≠ neutrality

Silence often strengthens armed actors.

5) Policy perspective: Ideal public engagement model

A balanced model would look like this:

Role	Who leads	Public function
Negotiation	Govt + armed groups	Not direct
Consultation	Civil society	Active
Monitoring	Media + academia	Active
Legitimisation	Public	Decisive
Implementation	Govt	Supported by communities

6) Ethical dimension

The SoO is not just a security agreement.

It is a question of:

• coexistence

• justice

• territorial belonging

• political dignity

These cannot be negotiated without the voices of the people.

But:

Public energy must be directed toward peace-building, not identity mobilisation.

7) Strategic conclusion

The public should not initiate the SoO’s future in the sense of driving negotiations.

But the public must not remain silent either.

The correct position is:

Engaged citizenship, not silent spectatorship and not street-driven negotiation.

The future of the SoO should emerge from:

1. Government–insurgent negotiation

2. Civil society consultation

3. Public legitimacy and oversight

Remove any one of these—and the process fails.

8) The real question ahead

The key issue is no longer:

“Should the SoO continue?”

It is:

• What political arrangement follows it?

• Who represents the people in that arrangement?

• Can communities coexist under a shared constitutional structure?

These questions cannot be answered by militants alone or by the state alone.

They require a politically conscious, peace-oriented public.

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Civil Society Roadmap for Engaging the Suspension of Operations (SoO)

Purpose:

To guide civil society organisations, community leaders, academics, media, women’s groups, youth bodies, and faith institutions in constructively engaging the future of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) without escalating conflict or undermining formal negotiations.

This roadmap treats civil society as a peace stakeholder, not a negotiating party and not a passive observer.

1) Guiding Principles

1. Peace before politics

• Prevent violence first; political solutions must follow stability.

2. Neutral facilitation, not ethnic mobilisation

• Civil society must avoid becoming an extension of any armed or political bloc.

3. Community legitimacy

• Engage displaced persons, hill–valley populations, minorities, and youth.

4. Evidence-based advocacy

• Use research, data, and consultations—not rumours or emotional narratives.

5. Complement, don’t replace, negotiations

• Formal dialogue remains the responsibility of government and armed groups.

2) Core Roles of Civil Society

A. Bridge-builder

• Create communication channels across ethnic communities.

• Prevent narrative hardening and misinformation.

B. Accountability actor

• Monitor:

  • ceasefire violations

  • camp militarisation

  • civilian safety

• Publish neutral reports.

C. Legitimacy provider

• Ensure any settlement reflects people’s aspirations.

D. Peace constituency builder

• Shift discourse from:

  • territorial competition
    to

  • coexistence and governance solutions.

3) Operational Roadmap

Phase I — Stabilisation (Immediate: 0–12 months)

1. Community dialogue platforms

• Inter-community meetings in safe neutral locations.

• Inclusion:

  • women

  • youth

  • displaced populations

2. Misinformation control

• Rapid-response civil fact-check networks.

• Local-language communication.

3. Protection advocacy

• Push for:

  • civilian safety corridors

  • humanitarian access

  • camp regulation

Phase II — Consultation (1–3 years)

1. People’s consultation forums

Collect structured public opinion on:

• autonomy models

• territorial governance

• policing and administration

• rehabilitation priorities

2. Academic engagement

Universities and think-tanks should:

• map conflict drivers

• propose governance models

• document lived experiences

3. Youth peace leadership programmes

Prevent militant recruitment and radicalisation.

Phase III — Policy Engagement (3–5 years)

1. Civil policy papers

Submit recommendations to:

• Union Government

• State Government

• parliamentary committees

2. Multi-community conventions

Joint resolutions from:

• Meitei

• Kuki

• Naga

• minority groups

3. Track-II dialogue

Backchannel consultations among:

• civil society leaders

• former administrators

• security experts

Phase IV — Settlement Support (Long term)

1. Reintegration support

• vocational training

• livelihood programmes

• trauma counselling

2. Social reconciliation initiatives

• memorialisation

• restorative justice forums

• shared cultural programmes

3. Monitoring settlement implementation

Civil society watchdog role over:

• autonomy structures

• resource allocation

• policing reforms

4) Institutional Mechanisms Needed

Civil Society Peace Forum

• Umbrella platform representing all communities.

Independent Monitoring Group

• Document ceasefire compliance and civilian impact.

Knowledge Consortium

• Universities, journalists, and researchers producing policy inputs.

Women-led peace networks

• Evidence globally shows women’s participation increases peace durability.

5) Risks to Avoid

Ethnic capture

Civil bodies becoming mouthpieces of specific armed or political groups.

Over-politicisation

Turning SoO into election rhetoric.

Information warfare

Unverified claims undermining fragile trust.

Militarisation of activism

Civil groups aligning with armed structures.

6) Indicators of Successful Civil Engagement

Indicator	Desired outcome
Reduced hate narratives	Increased inter-community communication
Informed public debate	Policy-based discussions
Youth participation	Lower recruitment into militancy
Civil monitoring	Higher ceasefire compliance
Joint resolutions	Shared peace agenda

7) Strategic Position of Civil Society

Civil society should act as:

• Mediator of narratives

• Guardian of public interest

• Pressure mechanism for peace

• Legitimiser of final settlement

But not:

• negotiator

• armed actor

• partisan mobiliser

8) The Central Question Ahead

The real issue is no longer whether SoO continues.

It is:

• What political structure replaces it?

• How will communities coexist afterward?

• Who guarantees justice and security for all sides?

Civil society must prepare society for that transition.

9) Action Agenda (Immediate)

1. Establish a joint civil peace platform.

2. Begin structured public consultations across districts.

3. Launch inter-ethnic youth dialogue initiatives.

4. Create a civil monitoring mechanism for ceasefire impact.

5. Produce a shared “People’s Vision for Peace” document.

10) Final Strategic Insight

The future of the SoO will not be decided only in Delhi, Imphal, or insurgent camps.

It will ultimately be determined by whether society:

• remains polarised
  or

• develops a shared imagination of coexistence.

Civil society’s role is to prepare that imagination.

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People-Led Peace vs Security-Led Peace in Manipur

Purpose:

To frame a structured policy and public debate on whether sustainable peace in Manipur should emerge primarily from community-driven processes or from state-led security stabilisation, especially in the context of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) and the post-2023 conflict landscape.

1) Conceptual Definitions

People-Led Peace

Peace driven by:

• civil society

• community leaders

• women and youth networks

• faith institutions

• local reconciliation processes

Focus:

• healing social fractures

• restoring coexistence

• participatory political solutions

Security-Led Peace

Peace imposed or stabilised through:

• military and police presence

• ceasefire enforcement

• disarmament and surveillance

• state-controlled negotiations

Focus:

• restoring order

• preventing violence

• territorial and institutional control

2) Why This Debate Matters in Manipur

Manipur’s crisis is not only insurgency—it is:

• ethnic fragmentation

• political distrust

• territorial anxiety

• governance breakdown

The SoO exists at the intersection of:

• armed conflict

• identity politics

• federal security strategy

Thus, the central dilemma:

Should peace emerge from society rebuilding trust, or from state enforcing stability first?

3) Argument: In Favour of People-Led Peace

A. Addresses root causes

• Ethnic mistrust cannot be solved by force.

• Community reconciliation reduces long-term violence.

B. Legitimacy

• Agreements backed by public consent endure longer.

C. Prevents elite capture

• Peace processes dominated by militants and governments exclude citizens.

D. Healing trauma

• Displacement, killings, and segregation require social healing.

E. Youth deradicalisation

• Community leadership counters militant recruitment.

Key claim:

Security may stop violence temporarily; only society can prevent its return.

4) Argument: In Favour of Security-Led Peace

A. Immediate stability

• Without security, dialogue is impossible.

B. Control of armed actors

• Militants respond to enforcement more than persuasion.

C. Territorial integrity

• State authority must remain intact.

D. Prevents fragmentation

• Excessive decentralisation may intensify identity politics.

E. Crisis management

• In active conflict zones, state-led response is necessary.

Key claim:

Peace cannot be negotiated amid chaos; order must precede reconciliation.

5) Limitations of Each Model

People-Led Peace — Risks

• Ethnic mobilisation disguised as peace activism

• Lack of authority over armed actors

• Emotional politics undermining negotiation

Security-Led Peace — Risks

• Militarised normalcy

• Alienation of communities

• Perception of bias by state actors

• No resolution of political grievances

6) Evidence from Conflict Studies

Global lessons show:

Model	Outcome
Pure security-led	Temporary stability, recurring conflict
Pure people-led	Moral legitimacy, weak enforcement
Hybrid approach	Most sustainable peace outcomes

Examples from other regions show that:

• ceasefire + community reconciliation together produce durable settlements.

7) Manipur-Specific Realities

Security realities

• Armed groups remain active.

• Territorial separation exists.

• Policing capacity uneven.

Social realities

• Deep ethnic polarisation.

• Displacement and trauma.

• Narrative warfare through media and politics.

This makes a single-model peace approach unrealistic.

8) Hybrid Peace Model: The Practical Path

Phase 1 — Security stabilisation

• Enforce ceasefire.

• Protect civilians.

• Prevent militant expansion.

Phase 2 — People-driven reconciliation

• Inter-community dialogues.

• trauma healing initiatives.

• youth engagement.

Phase 3 — Political settlement

• Constitutional negotiation.

• autonomy and governance reforms.

Phase 4 — Shared implementation

• Public oversight + state enforcement.

9) Critical Debate Questions

For policymakers:

• Can security forces be seen as neutral by all communities?

• How long can ceasefire management continue without political settlement?

For civil society:

• Can community initiatives remain non-partisan?

• How to engage without becoming proxies for armed groups?

For public discourse:

• Who represents “the people”?

• Can reconciliation occur without justice?

10) Ethical Dimension

Security-led peace prioritises:

• order

• control

• sovereignty

People-led peace prioritises:

• dignity

• justice

• coexistence

Sustainable peace requires balancing both.

11) Strategic Insight

The real conflict in Manipur is not only between communities.

It is between two visions of peace:

• Peace as absence of violence (security lens)

• Peace as presence of justice and coexistence (people’s lens)

Neither alone is sufficient.

12) Debate Conclusion

People-led peace without security collapses into disorder.

Security-led peace without people collapses into resentment.

The future of the SoO and Manipur depends on merging both:

Security creates space for peace.

Society gives peace its meaning.

The central challenge ahead is not choosing one model.

It is building a security-supported, people-legitimised peace architecture.

13) Closing Line for Policy and Public Debate

Manipur does not need:

• only more troops
  or

• only more dialogues

It needs a process where:

• the state guarantees safety,

• communities rebuild trust,

• and politics delivers a just settlement.

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Comparative Assessment: Kuki SoO vs Naga SoO

The Suspension of Operations (SoO) arrangements involving Kuki armed groups and Naga insurgent organisations represent two of the most important ceasefire architectures in Northeast India. While both aim to reduce armed confrontation and enable political dialogue, they differ significantly in origin, structure, political depth, and outcomes.

This comparative assessment is framed for academic, policy, and strategic analysis.

1) Conceptual Foundations

Dimension	Kuki SoO	Naga SoO
Nature	Ceasefire-cum-management framework	Political ceasefire linked to sovereignty negotiations
Initiation logic	Contain insurgency and integrate groups into talks	Resolve long-standing national-political movement
Scope	Primarily Manipur-centric	Pan-Naga (Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal, Assam, Myanmar linkages)

2) Historical Origins

Kuki SoO

• Emerged mid-2000s to reduce violence and integrate multiple Kuki militant factions.

• Tripartite arrangement:

  • Government of India

  • Manipur Government

  • Kuki umbrella groups like Kuki National Organisation and United Peoples’ Front

• Focus: ceasefire, camp confinement, political dialogue toward autonomy.

Naga SoO / Ceasefire

• Began in 1997 between Government of India and National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak‑Muivah).

• Later expanded to other factions like NSCN (Khaplang) (before breakdown) and Naga National Political Groups.

• Focus: negotiated political settlement over Naga sovereignty, identity, and territorial integration.

3) Political Depth

Dimension	Kuki SoO	Naga SoO
Political objective	Administrative autonomy, territorial council, UT proposals	Sovereignty-linked settlement, shared governance, Naga integration
Ideological foundation	Ethnic protection and political representation	Nationalist movement with historical treaty claims
Negotiation level	Security + administrative	Constitutional + historical + geopolitical

Key insight:

The Naga process is fundamentally political; the Kuki SoO is primarily security-administrative with emerging political dimensions.

4) Institutional Structure

Kuki SoO

• Designated camps for cadres.

• Stipends and monitoring.

• Limited arms regulation.

• State government is a formal stakeholder.

Naga SoO

• Ceasefire monitoring groups.

• Direct Centre–insurgent political dialogue.

• Less camp-based containment; more political engagement.

5) Territorial Dimension

Dimension	Kuki SoO	Naga SoO
Territorial claims	Within Manipur hill areas	“Greater Nagalim” concept across states
Impact	Ethnic balancing within Manipur	Inter-state political implications
Conflict sensitivity	High valley–hill tension	High multi-state and ethnic implications

6) Public Legitimacy

Kuki SoO

• Mixed perceptions:

  • Seen as necessary by Kuki civil society.

  • Viewed with suspicion by Meitei and Naga communities.

Naga SoO

• Strong internal legitimacy among Nagas.

• Political opposition from neighbouring states fearing territorial change.

7) Security Outcomes

Dimension	Kuki SoO	Naga SoO
Violence reduction	Moderate	Significant decline in large-scale insurgency
Militancy transformation	Semi-demobilised	Politicised insurgency leadership
Fragmentation risk	High (multiple factions)	Managed through umbrella negotiations

8) Negotiation Progress

Kuki SoO

• Repeated renewals.

• No final political settlement.

• Shift from insurgency → autonomy discourse.

Naga SoO

• 2015 Framework Agreement between Centre and NSCN-IM.

• Continuing talks on constitutionally sensitive issues (flag, constitution, territorial autonomy).

9) Structural Challenges

Kuki SoO

• Seen as ethnic-specific.

• Weak final roadmap.

• Camps risk becoming parallel authority centres.

• Linked with ongoing ethnic tensions in Manipur.

Naga SoO

• Territorial integration issue unresolved.

• Federal resistance from neighbouring states.

• Symbolic demands complicate settlement.

10) Strategic Differences

Strategic Lens	Kuki SoO	Naga SoO
Type	Conflict management	Political conflict resolution attempt
Leadership structure	Multiple armed factions	Centralised ideological leadership
State involvement	Manipur government central	Primarily Union-led negotiations
Longevity trajectory	Uncertain	Long-term political process

11) Lessons Each Process Offers

What Kuki SoO can learn from Naga SoO

1. Clear political roadmap.

2. Unified negotiation platform.

3. Ideological clarity and negotiation objectives.

4. Transition from camp-based control to political engagement.

What Naga SoO can learn from Kuki SoO

1. Localised governance solutions.

2. State-level integration.

3. Administrative autonomy experimentation.

12) Risk Comparison

Risk	Kuki SoO	Naga SoO
Collapse of ceasefire	Medium–High	Low–Medium
Ethnic backlash	Very High	High
Militant fragmentation	High	Moderate
Political settlement delay	High	High but structured

13) Future Trajectories

Kuki SoO

Possible paths:

• Administrative autonomy settlement

• UT arrangement

• Status quo ceasefire continuation

• Breakdown amid ethnic tensions

Naga SoO

Possible paths:

• Asymmetric federal solution

• Cultural-political autonomy without territorial change

• Extended negotiation without final agreement

14) Core Analytical Insight

The two SoOs operate at different levels of conflict:

• Kuki SoO:
  security stabilisation + ethnic political accommodation within a state.

• Naga SoO:
  historical political movement negotiating with the Union over identity, sovereignty, and constitutional space.

They are not parallel processes—they are different layers of India’s Northeast peace architecture.

15) Strategic Conclusion

Kuki SoO = peace management framework.

Naga SoO = political settlement process still unfolding.

Sustainable peace in Manipur and the wider Northeast will likely depend on:

• aligning these processes,

• avoiding ethnic competition between them,

• and moving both toward institutional political settlements rather than indefinite ceasefire management.

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A district-level impact comparison: Kuki vs Naga ceasefire zones 

Kuki SoO Zones vs Naga Ceasefire Zones

This comparison focuses on how ceasefire arrangements shaped governance, security, and social relations across affected districts.

A. Kuki SoO–influenced districts (primarily Manipur hills)

Key districts:

• Churachandpur

• Kangpokpi

• Chandel

• Tengnoupal

• Pherzawl

Impacts

Security

• Reduced direct confrontation with security forces.

• Emergence of semi-regulated militant camps.

• Continued ethnic insecurity, especially post-2023.

Governance

• Weak state penetration in some hill pockets.

• Parallel influence of armed group leadership in local decision-making.

Economy

• Informal taxation networks persisted.

• Limited development delivery due to instability.

Society

• Ethnic consolidation among Kuki-Zo communities.

• Segregation from valley populations intensified.

B. Naga Ceasefire–influenced districts

Nagaland

• Dimapur

• Kohima

• Mon

• Tuensang

Manipur (Naga-inhabited)

• Ukhrul

• Senapati

• Tamenglong

Impacts

Security

• Sharp decline in large-scale insurgent violence.

• Militancy transformed into political negotiation structures.

Governance

• Stronger institutional functioning than Kuki SoO zones.

• Greater civil society participation in politics.

Economy

• Expansion of markets and cross-border trade.

• Continued informal taxation by factions.

Society

• Consolidated Naga political identity.

• Strong civil organisations shaping negotiations.

Comparative district pattern

Dimension	Kuki SoO districts	Naga ceasefire districts
Violence reduction	Partial	Significant
State presence	Weak–uneven	Moderate–strong
Armed group role	Camp-based, local influence	Political negotiators
Civil society influence	Emerging	Institutionalised
Ethnic integration	Low	Moderate within Naga areas

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Negotiation architecture map (actors, institutions, influence networks)

Actors, Institutions, Influence Networks

A. Kuki SoO negotiation structure

Core actors

• Government of India (Ministry of Home Affairs)

• Government of Manipur

• Kuki National Organisation

• United Peoples’ Front

Supporting influence networks

• Church bodies

• Tribal councils

• Student organisations

• Civil society platforms

Security stakeholders

• Indian Army

• Assam Rifles

• State police

Nature of architecture

• Tripartite

• security-administrative dominant

• state government central

B. Naga ceasefire negotiation architecture

Core actors

• Government of India (interlocutor system)

• National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah)

• Naga National Political Groups

Civil influence institutions

• Naga Hoho

• church federations

• tribal councils

• student bodies

Security stakeholders

• Army and central forces (ceasefire monitoring role)

Nature of architecture

• Centre-insurgent direct

• political-constitutional dominant

• civil legitimacy strong

Structural contrast

Feature	Kuki SoO	Naga process
Negotiation level	Administrative + security	Political + constitutional
Role of state govt	Central	Secondary
Civil society weight	Moderate	High
Interlocutor role	Limited	Strong

A scenario forecast: What happens if one settlement concludes before the other

If One Settlement Concludes Before the Other

Scenario A

Naga settlement concludes first

Likely effects

• Pressure on Kuki groups for similar autonomy.

• Meitei concerns over territorial balance.

• Reconfiguration of hill politics.

Risks

• Kuki radicalisation if excluded.

• Competitive ethnic federalism.

Scenario B

Kuki settlement concludes first

Likely effects

• Demand escalation among Naga groups in Manipur.

• Valley backlash if territorial implications arise.

Risks

• Parallel identity mobilisation.

• Fragmentation of peace processes.

Scenario C

Both settlements delayed

Likely effects

• Ceasefire fatigue.

• Militant fragmentation.

• Youth radicalisation.

Scenario D

Coordinated settlement architecture

Likely effects

• Shared federal design.

• Reduced ethnic competition.

• Stronger Northeast peace model.

Most sustainable scenario.

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A scholarly paper-style analysis (with theoretical frameworks in conflict studies)

Theoretical Framework: Conflict Studies Perspective

Title

Ceasefire Without Closure: Comparative Political Sociology of Kuki and Naga SoO Frameworks

A. Theoretical lenses

1. Conflict management vs conflict resolution

• Kuki SoO → management model

• Naga process → resolution attempt

2. Hybrid sovereignty theory

State authority coexists with armed non-state actors.

• Camps and local influence = hybrid governance zones.

3. Ethno-political bargaining model

Groups negotiate autonomy to preserve identity within state framework.

4. Federal asymmetry theory

Peace settlements reshape centre–state power distribution.

B. Structural differences explained

Historical legitimacy

Naga movement:

• decades-long political narrative.

Kuki insurgency:

• reactive mobilisation rooted in ethnic protection.

Leadership centralisation

• Naga: ideological leadership cohesion.

• Kuki: multiple factional structures.

Negotiation scale

• Naga: national constitutional question.

• Kuki: sub-state administrative restructuring.

C. Peace durability model

Research shows durable settlements require:

1. political roadmap

2. unified negotiating actors

3. public legitimacy

4. economic reintegration

Naga process meets more of these conditions.

D. Why Kuki SoO remains transitional

• camp-based ceasefire model

• absence of constitutional endpoint

• embedded in ongoing ethnic contestation

E. Risk theory

Without settlement:

• insurgency morphs into identity politics

• ceasefire becomes permanent governance substitute

• youth radicalisation risk rises

F. Future research directions

• valley–hill federal restructuring models

• multi-ethnic peace architecture

• demobilisation economics

Core Synthesis Across All Four Analyses

Kuki SoO

• localised

• security-heavy

• politically unfinished

Naga ceasefire

• historically rooted

• politically deep

• closer to constitutional settlement

The biggest strategic risk:

Peace processes evolving separately may produce ethnic competition rather than regional stability.

The biggest strategic opportunity:

Aligning them into a coordinated Northeast political settlement architecture.

Where the debate now moves

The key future question is not:

• Which SoO succeeds first?

It is:

• Can India design a multi-layered federal peace framework that accommodates
  Naga aspirations,
  Kuki political demands,
  and Manipur’s territorial sensitivities simultaneously?

Concluding Remark

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The Future of the Kuki Suspension of Operations: From Ceasefire to Political Courage

Nearly two decades after the Suspension of Operations (SoO) with Kuki armed groups began, the agreement stands at a crossroads. What started as a pragmatic security arrangement to halt violence and open channels of dialogue has become something far more complex—an instrument of fragile stability, a symbol of unresolved aspirations, and a mirror reflecting the deep fractures of Manipur’s society.

The SoO cannot remain what it has been: a temporary arrangement renewed year after year without a political destination. Ceasefires are not meant to become permanent structures. They are bridges. And bridges, by definition, must lead somewhere.

The Kuki SoO did succeed in one crucial respect—it prevented large-scale insurgency from spiralling uncontrollably. It created space for dialogue, reduced direct confrontation, and allowed a generation to imagine alternatives to armed struggle. That achievement should not be underestimated.

Yet the process has also exposed its limitations. It has not produced a clear political roadmap. It has not fully demobilised armed structures. It has not built trust across communities. And in the aftermath of recent ethnic violence, it now operates within an environment where suspicion, fear, and competing territorial anxieties threaten to overwhelm any fragile gains.

The future of the SoO depends on whether it remains a mechanism of management or evolves into a framework for resolution.

Continuing the status quo—annual extensions without structural reform—will only deepen uncertainty. Camps risk becoming permanent, armed hierarchies risk institutionalising, and younger generations risk inheriting a conflict frozen but not resolved. A ceasefire that delays politics indefinitely can ultimately undermine peace itself.

But abandoning the SoO is not a solution either. Its collapse would likely reopen cycles of militancy, fragment armed groups, and push the region back toward instability. The cost would be borne not by negotiators or leaders, but by ordinary people who have already endured displacement, insecurity, and loss.

The path forward requires political courage—on all sides.

For the government, it means moving beyond containment toward a defined political outcome, whether through administrative autonomy, governance restructuring, or constitutional innovation. For armed groups, it means recognising that legitimacy in the future will come not from weapons, but from democratic engagement and public trust. For civil society, it means resisting polarisation and building a shared vision of coexistence rather than competitive victimhood.

Most importantly, it demands acknowledging a simple truth: the SoO is not merely about militants and the state. It is about people—their security, dignity, identity, and future.

Peace in Manipur cannot be secured by force alone, nor negotiated solely behind closed doors. It must be socially anchored, politically negotiated, and institutionally guaranteed. The SoO can still serve as the foundation for that transition—but only if it is allowed to evolve.

The real question now is not whether the SoO should continue.

It is whether it can transform.

• From ceasefire to settlement.
• From containment to coexistence.
• From temporary arrangement to political resolution.

The future of the Kuki SoO will not be decided by renewals on paper, but by the willingness of all stakeholders to confront the harder task ahead: building a political order where peace is not supervised, but lived.

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Presentation Prepared by Pupu Zou