Abstract: This paper traces the structural causes of sustained inter-ethnic violence between Meitei (valley) and Kuki-Zo (hill) communities in Manipur from statehood (1972) through 2026. It argues that colonial-era administrative divisions, constitutional asymmetries (land and Scheduled Tribe protections), competing territorial imaginaries, long-term militarisation, and governance deficits created a layered grievance architecture that crystallised into episodic and large-scale violence. The analysis is localised through district-level examples (Imphal East/West, Bishnupur, Churachandpur, Senapati, Tamenglong, Chandel and Kangpokpi) and is accompanied by a timeline (1972–2026) of major political, legal and violent episodes. Policy implications for trust-building, legal clarity, and devolved governance are offered.
1. Introduction
On 21 January 1972, Manipur was accorded full statehood under the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 - an administrative change that formalised a polity containing a densely populated Imphal Valley (predominantly Meitei) surrounded by extensive hill tracts inhabited by multiple tribal communities, including Kuki-Zo and Naga groups. The statehood moment fused two territorially and administratively distinct social worlds into a single state without robust integrative mechanisms, laying the foundation for contestations over land, political representation, and identity.
2. Conceptual framework and methodology
This analysis uses a structural political-sociological lens: (1) institutional legacies (colonial and constitutional arrangements); (2) political economy (land, resources, migration); (3) security-mobilisation (insurgency, militias and state response); and (4) identity politics (competing majority/minority claims). District-level illustrations are drawn from government district profiles, contemporary reporting, and academic studies to ground the structural claims. (Sources and selection rationale are listed in the references and timeline notes.)
3. Core structural drivers
3.1 Colonial and administrative legacy: the hill–valley separation
British administrative practice treated the Imphal Valley (direct rule around the monarchy) and hill areas (indirect rule via tribal chiefs) as distinct governance zones. That separation persisted in social organisation and in everyday expectations of authority and rights - so statehood did not eliminate institutionalised difference but made it a domain of formal politics.
3.2 Constitutional asymmetries: land, ST protections and perceived zero-sum stakes
Hill areas carry legal protections that restrict transfer of tribal land to non-tribals and enable affirmative action via the Scheduled Tribe (ST) status for many hill communities. Meitei demands (at times) for ST recognition - or broader changes in quota regimes - are perceived in the hills as threats to constitutional safeguards, while Meiteis perceive themselves as disadvantaged in access to protected hill land and ST quotas. These legal asymmetries have become existential political claims rather than administrative technicalities.
3.3 Competing territorial imaginaries and ethnicity as political currency
Kuki-Zo and Naga demands for territorial recognition (e.g., visions of Greater Kukiland or Nagalim) contrast with Meitei anxieties about the integrity of the state and valley-centric political control. Territorial claims are reinforced by histories of resettlement and contest over village boundaries, creating durable micro-flashpoints.
3.4 Militarisation, insurgency and cycles of mistrust
Multiple armed groups - ethnically constituted militias as well as insurgent organisations - have operated in and around Manipur’s hills since the late twentieth century. Militarisation hardened security logic: communities turned to arms or militias for protection, and state security operations often deepened grievances rather than neutralising threats. Past Kuki–Naga clashes (1992–1997) are instructive: large population displacements, village burnings and cycles of retaliatory violence entrenched mistrust.
3.5 Governance deficits and uneven development
Hill districts (e.g., Tamenglong, Chandel, Churachandpur) have long experienced weaker administrative presence, limited infrastructure and weaker public service delivery compared with valley districts. These deficits fuel perceptions of neglect among hill communities and perceptions among valley residents that hill areas are politically disconnected. Administrative changes (for example, the creation of 7 new districts in 2016) themselves produced contestation over boundaries and control.
4. District-level illustrations
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Imphal East & Imphal West (Imphal Valley) - densest Meitei populations, administrative core, flashpoints when valley-based protests or counter-mobilisations occur; urban displacement during large-scale unrest is concentrated here.
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Bishnupur (valley border district) - acts as a border zone between the valley and the southern hills (Churachandpur); several clashes and displacement events in 2023 occurred near the Bishnupur–Churachandpur borders.
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Churachandpur (Kuki-Zo heartland) - Kuki-majority district that has served as a mobilisation centre for hill protests; 1990s displacement saw many Kukis relocate here, and 2023 violence was concentrated along Churachandpur’s border areas.
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Senapati, Tamenglong, Ukhrul (hill districts with Naga presence / mixed populations) - sites with histories of inter-tribal (Naga–Kuki) tensions and contested claims in the 1990s; demographic mosaics complicate blanket policy solutions.
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Chandel & Tengnoupal - southern hill districts bordering Myanmar; peripheral geography adds cross-border dynamics (migration, insurgent logistics) to local insecurity.
(These district illustrations are not exhaustive but demonstrate how structural drivers manifest differently across the state.)
5. Timeline (1972–2026) — Selected events (concise)
Year — Event — Significance / Districts affected
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1972 - Manipur granted statehood (North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971). Significance: formal integration of the valley and hill administrative domains.
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1980s–1990s - Rise of multiple insurgent groups across ethnic lines; increasing militarisation. Significance: securitisation of politics.
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1992–1997 - Intense Kuki–Naga clashes (large displacement, village burnings notably affecting Churachandpur, Tamenglong, Senapati). Significance: enduring trauma and demographic shifts.
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2000s - Sporadic ethnic clashes and ongoing insurgency politics; consolidation of ethnic civil society organisations. Significance: identity politics institutionalised.
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2016 (Dec) - State government creates 7 new districts (total 16). Significance: administrative reorganisation produced political contestation over new boundaries (Kangpokpi, Tengnoupal, Pherzawl, etc.).
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2018–2022 - Periodic local violence, protests over land and resources; continued governance challenges in hill districts.
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14 Apr 2023 - Manipur High Court order referenced in public debate about Meitei ST demand (legal sparks preceding mass protests). Significance: legal ambiguity catalysed mass mobilisations.
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3 May 2023 - Tribal Solidarity March (ATSUM) and immediate outbreak of large-scale Meitei–Kuki violence; concentrated along Imphal Valley–Churachandpur border (Bishnupur, Churachandpur, Imphal). Significance: massive displacement, deaths, attacks on houses and places of worship.
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May–Dec 2023 - Widespread displacement (tens of thousands), internet shutdowns, and multiple investigations (Supreme Court panel, judicial inquiries). Significance: national attention, contested accountability.
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2024–2025 - Ongoing localised clashes, judicial and administrative responses, and slow return/relief efforts; reported fatalities and communal tensions persist into 2025. Significance: Fragile peace, protracted humanitarian needs.
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2026 - Continued political mobilisation (e.g., rallies in Churachandpur) and state measures for policing and administrative reforms; statehood anniversaries refocus attention on structural remedies. Significance: unresolved structural drivers remain salient.
(Note: timeline entries summarise major and widely reported episodes - see the references below for primary documentation and further reading.)
6. Discussion: Why structural fixes matter
Short-term security measures and episodic relief cannot resolve the conflict’s deep structural roots. Legal ambiguity (e.g., around ST status), contested district boundaries, livelihood insecurity in hills, and political incentives to mobilise ethnically all maintain a high risk of recurrence. Reconciliation requires (1) legal clarity and transparent processes around ST and land questions; (2) decentralised governance and development prioritising hill districts; (3) credible, impartial investigations into wartime abuses; and (4) inter-communal confidence building (joint economic projects, neutral arbitration mechanisms).
7. Policy implications (selective recommendations)
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Transparent legal review of ST-related claims with independent assessments and phased implementation to reduce zero-sum framing.
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District-level development compacts targeted at hill districts (Tamenglong, Chandel, Pherzawl, Churachandpur) to reduce governance deficits and economic grievances.
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Security sector reform focusing on community policing, demobilisation of non-state militias, and independent oversight of security responses.
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Truth, reparations and local reconciliation mechanisms informed by judicial fact-finding but driven by local civil society participation.
8. Conclusion
The Kuki–Zo–Meitei violence is deeply structural: rooted in colonial administrative legacies, constitutional asymmetries, competing territorial imaginaries, militarisation, and governance failures. District-level heterogeneity means responses must be granular—combining legal clarity, locally tailored development, impartial justice mechanisms, and long-term confidence-building—to transform zero-sum identity politics into a cooperative polity.
References
Indian Express. (2026, January). As Manipur, Meghalaya, and Tripura celebrate statehood day, a look back at the birth of the Northeast. The Indian Express.
History Journal. (2025). Colonial encounter and the hill-valley dichotomy in Manipur (working paper/PDF). History Journal.
Intergovernmental Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). (2023, December). Understanding the complex conflict unfolding in Manipur (report). IWGIA.
Ziviler Friedensdienst (ZFD). (2006). Interrogating peace — The Naga–Kuki Conflict in Manipur (Urvashi et al.). ZFD.
Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). 2023–2025 Manipur violence. In Wikipedia (overview entry summarising events). Retrieved 2026.
Times of India. (2016, December 9). Manipur cabinet decides formation of 7 new districts. Times of India.
Supreme Court Observer / Oversight Committee. (2023). Report and related orders on Manipur violence judicial oversight (PDF). Supreme Court Observer
Wired. (2023). An Internet Shutdown Means Manipur Is Burning in the Dark. Wired Magazine.
Reuters. (2023, September). Indian protesters try to storm home of Manipur chief minister (news report). Reuters.
Government of Manipur — District Websites (Bishnupur; Tamenglong). (n.d.). About District / Culture & Heritage (official district profiles).Bishnupur.nic.in
Maps of India / MapsofWorld / BurningCompass. (various). Maps of Manipur districts and Imphal Valley (cartographic sources used for district localisation).
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Below is a rigorous, evidence-based academic explanation of the claim that Manipur’s hill districts have faced “stepmotherly treatment” compared to the valley districts in development-supported by data, district-wise examples, and scholarly sources.
Stepmotherly Treatment of Hill Districts in Manipur: A Comparative Analysis of Developmental Disparities Between Hills and Valley
1. Introduction
The perception that the hill districts of Manipur have been subjected to “stepmotherly treatment” in development is deeply rooted in the state’s socio-political discourse. This perception arises from persistent disparities in infrastructure, economic opportunities, administrative presence, and public service delivery between the Imphal Valley and the surrounding hill districts. Scholars and policy reports consistently show that developmental resources, institutions, and infrastructure have historically been concentrated in the valley, producing structural inequalities that have shaped ethnic relations and political conflicts in Manipur.
2. Structural Pattern of Developmental Inequality
2.1 Concentration of Infrastructure in the Valley
Empirical studies demonstrate that major infrastructure facilities—roads, educational institutions, hospitals, industries, and administrative offices—are overwhelmingly located in the valley districts. This concentration has created a stark developmental gap between hills and valley.
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Research shows that “major infrastructures were mostly located in valley districts,” leading to disparities in all key development indicators.
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Hill districts consistently lag behind valley districts in composite infrastructure indices and socio-economic indicators.
This spatial concentration of infrastructure has translated into uneven livelihood opportunities, reinforcing poverty and marginalisation in hill areas.
2.2 Economic and Social Backwardness of Hill Districts
Studies on poverty and deprivation highlight that hill districts suffer disproportionately from underdevelopment.
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Rural and hill areas show significantly higher poverty rates than urban and valley regions.
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Border and remote hill districts such as Senapati and Chandel exhibit higher deprivation levels compared to valley districts like Imphal East.
This pattern indicates that geographical remoteness combined with policy neglect has entrenched socio-economic disadvantages in hill regions.
3. District-wise Comparison of Developmental Disparities
3.1 Valley Districts: Imphal East, Imphal West, Bishnupur, Thoubal
The valley districts represent the political and economic core of Manipur.
Key features:
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Concentration of state capital, universities, hospitals, and industries.
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Better road connectivity and digital infrastructure.
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Higher literacy rates and employment opportunities.
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Greater access to government schemes and administrative institutions.
These districts benefit from proximity to decision-making centres and infrastructure investments, reinforcing cumulative advantages.
3.2 Hill Districts: Churachandpur, Kangpokpi, Tamenglong, Senapati, Ukhrul, Chandel, Tengnoupal, Pherzawl
In contrast, hill districts face structural disadvantages:
(a) Infrastructure Deficit
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Poor road connectivity and limited transport networks.
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Inadequate healthcare and educational facilities.
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Limited electricity, water supply, and digital access.
Studies confirm that hill districts remain “way behind the valley districts” in infrastructure development.
(b) Administrative Marginalisation
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Weak presence of state institutions.
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Delayed implementation of development projects.
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Limited bureaucratic capacity at district and sub-district levels.
(c) Economic Marginalisation
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High dependence on agriculture and shifting cultivation.
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Limited industrialisation and market access.
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High unemployment and migration.
Scholars argue that postcolonial state policies failed to address local problems, thereby sharpening the hill–valley divide.
4. Developmental Expenditure and the Politics of Resource Allocation
A critical dimension of the “stepmotherly treatment” narrative relates to government spending.
4.1 Evidence from Government Reports
A Government of Manipur committee on fund flow found:
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Hill districts’ share of developmental expenditure fluctuated between about 31% and 45% of total state developmental spending between 2011–12 and 2020–21.
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The committee also noted difficulties in accurately tracking funds for hill areas due to the absence of a clear budgetary framework.
This suggests not only uneven spending but also institutional weaknesses in monitoring hill development.
4.2 Contemporary Debate on Funding
Recent commentary highlights that hill districts received over ₹17,259 crore in development funds over the last decade, challenging simplistic claims of complete neglect.
However, the persistence of underdevelopment indicates that:
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Resource allocation alone is insufficient.
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Implementation deficits, governance issues, and security challenges hinder effective development.
5. Historical Roots of the Developmental Divide
The hill–valley developmental gap is not accidental but historically produced.
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Colonial administration treated the hills and valleys as separate governance zones.
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Post-independence planning prioritised urban and valley-based development.
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Long-term conflict and insurgency disrupted development in hill areas.
Scholars emphasise that unless the hill–valley developmental divide is reduced, sustainable peace in Manipur is unlikely.
6. Analytical Interpretation: “Stepmotherly Treatment” as Structural Inequality
The notion of “stepmotherly treatment” is not merely rhetorical but reflects structural realities:
6.1 Spatial Inequality
Development has followed a core–periphery model, where the valley acts as the core and hills as the periphery.
6.2 Political Economy of Development
Valley dominance in political institutions has influenced policy priorities and resource distribution.
6.3 Governance and Conflict Trap
Conflict and militarisation in hill areas discourage investment and weaken administrative capacity, creating a vicious cycle of underdevelopment.
7. Conclusion
The comparative analysis of Manipur’s hill and valley districts demonstrates that developmental inequality is systemic and multidimensional. While government spending on hill areas has increased, historical neglect, infrastructural deficits, administrative marginalisation, and implementation failures have produced a persistent perception—and reality—of “stepmotherly treatment.”
This developmental divide has profound implications: it fuels ethnic grievances, reinforces identity politics, and contributes to recurrent conflicts between communities. Therefore, bridging the hill–valley development gap is not merely a policy challenge but a prerequisite for long-term peace and integration in Manipur.
References
Haokip, T. T., & Reimeingam, M. (2021). A comparative analysis of hill and valley in Manipur. Institute for Social and Economic Change Working Paper.
Haokip, D. R. T. T. (2025). Implications of infrastructure on livelihoods: A comparative analysis of hills and valleys in Manipur. Journal of Social Studies.
Nath, B. K. (2020). Disparities in infrastructural development in districts of Manipur. Paripex – Indian Journal of Research.
Government of Manipur. (2021). Report of the Committee on Fund Flow to Hill Areas. Government of Manipur.
NDPublisher. (2023). Poverty in the hill districts of Manipur: A multidimensional analysis. Economic Affairs.
De, U. K. (2022). Urban concentration and deprivation in Manipur. European Journal of Nepalese Studies.
ResearchGate. (2024). Understanding the hills–valley divide and Meitei–Kuki conflict in Manipur.
Srivastava, S. K. (2019). Regional disparities in Manipur. Hill Geographer.
India Today NE. (2025). Manipur’s hill districts received ₹17,259 crore in development funds in the last decade.
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