In conflict-affected regions, peace is rarely a straight road. It is negotiated, fragile, and often deeply paradoxical. One such paradox confronting the public today is this: How can armed groups receive government stipends under ceasefire arrangements while simultaneously demanding separate administration or political autonomy? To many citizens, this appears contradictory - even unjust. Yet the reality is more layered.

Government stipends to armed groups do not emerge from generosity, nor are they rewards for past militancy. They are instruments of conflict management, embedded within ceasefire or Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements. Under such arrangements, armed groups agree to halt hostilities, confine themselves to designated camps, and suspend recruitment and offensive operations. In return, the state provides subsistence support - stipends, rations, and camp maintenance - to prevent cadres from returning to insurgency while political dialogue continues.

Peace negotiations, particularly in protracted ethnic or territorial conflicts, are seldom swift. They stretch across years, sometimes decades. During this liminal phase - neither war nor full peace - stipends serve a stabilizing function. Without them, idle and armed cadres risk fragmentation, criminalization, or re-mobilization. From the state’s perspective, the financial cost of maintaining ceasefires is far lower than the human and economic cost of renewed conflict.

However, ceasefire does not mean surrender. Most agreements explicitly allow armed groups to pursue their political aspirations through peaceful and democratic means. Thus, demands for separate administration, autonomy, or constitutional safeguards continue - but across negotiation tables rather than battlefields. What has shifted is not necessarily the goal, but the method.

This is where public discomfort intensifies. Taxpayers see former insurgents receiving government funds while advancing political demands that may challenge existing administrative or territorial arrangements. For conflict-weary civilians - many of whom have borne the brunt of violence - this can feel like a moral inversion: victims struggle for rehabilitation while former combatants receive structured support.

Such perception gaps are not trivial. They test the legitimacy of peace processes.

Governments must therefore walk a narrow ridge between strategic pragmatism and public accountability. Stipend-based ceasefires carry inherent risks. Armed groups may prolong negotiations to retain financial benefits. Cadres may resist disarmament. Parallel authority structures can emerge around camps. Political demands, instead of moderating, may harden.

This is why robust monitoring mechanisms are indispensable - weapon audits, camp inspections, periodic agreement reviews, and clear timelines for political dialogue. Peace cannot be indefinitely subsidized without measurable progress.

Globally, similar arrangements have marked transitions from armed conflict to political settlement - from Colombia to Nepal to the Philippines. In each case, stipends and cantonment support were controversial but instrumental in moving insurgencies from jungles to negotiation halls. The outcomes varied, but the logic remained consistent: it is cheaper - financially and morally - to pay for peace than to pay for war.

Yet peace funding must not become peace perpetuation without resolution.

The current contradiction, therefore, is less a policy anomaly and more a reflection of an unfinished peace. Stipends signal that armed confrontation has paused; continuing political demands signal that underlying grievances remain unresolved.

For governments, the task ahead is twofold: sustain ceasefires without incentivizing stagnation, and accelerate political dialogue without conceding constitutional instability. For the public, the challenge is to scrutinize peace processes without dismissing the difficult compromises they entail.

Peace, after all, is rarely pure. It is negotiated in grey zones - where former adversaries share state resources while bargaining for the future shape of governance itself.

The real question is not why stipends and political demands coexist.

The real question is how long they must.

Lets dig deeper for more clearity on the above topic:

1. How SoO (Suspension of Operations) Agreements Work in Northeast India

Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements are tripartite ceasefire arrangements usually signed between:

Government of India
Concerned State Government
Armed Group(s)

They are designed to pause armed conflict while political negotiations continue.

Core Operational Structure

🔹 1. Designated Camps / Cantonment System

Cadres of signatory groups must:

Stay in officially designated camps
Live under monitored conditions
Maintain nominal rolls (verified cadre lists)

Movement outside camps requires permission.

🔹 2. Weapons Management

Depending on the agreement:

Weapons are deposited in camps
Or kept under “double-lock” systems
Security forces monitor storage

Groups cannot carry arms publicly or conduct operations.

🔹 3. Ceasefire Ground Rules

Common prohibitions include:

No recruitment
No extortion / taxation
No intimidation of civilians
No arms training
No parallel policing

Violations can trigger:

Stipend suspension
Camp raids
Arrests
Termination of SoO

🔹 4. Joint Monitoring Mechanisms

Monitoring bodies typically include:

Indian Army
Assam Rifles
State Police
Intelligence agencies
Group representatives

They conduct:

Camp inspections
Weapon verification
Complaint inquiries
Civilian protection reviews

🔹 5. Political Dialogue Track

While security provisions operate, political talks proceed on:

Autonomy arrangements
Territorial councils
Administrative restructuring
Constitutional safeguards
Development packages

SoO = Security ceasefire + Political negotiation framework

2. Approximate Cadre Strength Receiving Stipends

Two major Kuki-Zo militant umbrellas under SoO:

KNO – Kuki National Organisation
UPF – United People’s Front

Both are conglomerates of multiple armed factions.

Estimated Cadre Numbers (approx ranges)

Umbrella	No. of constituent groups	Estimated cadres in SoO camps
KNO	~7 groups	~2,500 – 3,000 cadres
UPF	~8 groups	~2,000 – 2,500 cadres
Total	~15 groups	~4,500 – 5,500 cadres

Figures vary by year, verification drives, and faction splits.

Stipend Structure (approx)

Though periodically revised, widely cited ranges:

Cadres: ₹5,000 – ₹7,000 / month
Officers / commanders: ₹8,000 – ₹10,000 / month
Plus rations, camp utilities, and logistics support

Paid through:

State Home Department channels
Centrally reimbursed security expenditure funds

Purpose: subsistence, not salary.

3. Success vs Failure Rate of Such Peace Deals

SoO agreements are conflict-management tools, not final settlements. Their success must be measured in stages.

A. Areas of Success

1. Reduction in Large-Scale Violence

Where SoO holds:

Armed clashes drop sharply
Civilian casualties reduce
Ambushes / IED incidents decline

This creates space for governance and development.

2. Shift from Militancy to Politics

Many former insurgent groups:

Form political parties
Join autonomous councils
Contest elections
Enter peace accords

Example patterns seen across Northeast peace processes.

3. Development Access Improves

Ceasefires enable:

Road building
School functioning
Health services
Banking access
Welfare delivery

Conflict zones reopen administratively.

B. Structural Failures / Limitations

1. Prolonged “No War, No Peace” Situation

Some SoO arrangements last:

10–20+ years
Without final political settlement

Result: institutionalized ceasefire dependency.

2. Camp Militarization Without Disarmament

Common criticisms:

Weapons not fully surrendered
Training continues covertly
Cadres remain combat-ready

SoO pauses conflict but may not demobilize it.

3. Factional Splits

Peace processes sometimes create:

Pro-talk factions
Anti-talk breakaways
New insurgent splinters

These rogue groups can restart violence.

4. Public Legitimacy Crisis

Civilian grievances include:

Stipends to militants vs poor civilians
Continued extortion allegations
Parallel authority structures

This erodes trust in peace deals.

4. Comparative Outcome Assessment

Broad empirical pattern (Northeast context)

Indicator	Outcome trend under SoO
Battlefield violence	Major reduction
Civilian deaths	Reduced
Insurgent recruitment	Slowed but not eliminated
Final political settlement	Often delayed
Disarmament	Partial / slow
Public satisfaction	Mixed / contested

5. Success Rate — Analytical View

If measured by violence reduction → High success
If measured by final political resolution → Moderate to low
If measured by full disarmament → Limited success

SoO works best as:

Conflict freezing mechanism
Not conflict resolution mechanism

6. Key Determinants of Long-Term Success

Peace deals succeed when they include:

Time-bound political dialogue
Economic rehabilitation packages
Cadre reintegration programs
Skill / livelihood transition
Clear territorial arrangements
Constitutional closure mechanisms

Without these, ceasefires stagnate.

Bottom Line

SoO agreements in Northeast India are structured ceasefires with camps, stipends, and monitoring.
KNO + UPF together account for roughly 4,500–5,500 cadres receiving subsistence stipends.
They have been effective in reducing violence but less effective in delivering final political settlements or full disarmament.

References

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. (2008). Ground rules for Suspension of Operations (SoO) with Kuki militant groups. New Delhi: MHA.
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. (2012). Annual Report 2011–2012. New Delhi: MHA.
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. (2019). Annual Report 2018–2019. New Delhi: MHA.
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. (2022). Annual Report 2021–2022. New Delhi: MHA.
Manipur Government, Home Department. (2010). Memorandum of Suspension of Operations with Kuki National Organisation and United People’s Front. Imphal: Government of Manipur.
Manipur Legislative Assembly Secretariat. (Various years). Assembly starred and unstarred questions on SoO camps, cadre strength, and stipends. Imphal: MLA Secretariat.
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. (2011). Suspension of Operations agreements in Northeast India: Processes and prospects. New Delhi: IDSA.
Observer Research Foundation. (2020). Insurgency, ceasefires, and peace negotiations in Northeast India. New Delhi: ORF.
Vivekananda International Foundation. (2018). Conflict management and peace accords in India’s Northeast. New Delhi: VIF.
Centre for Land Warfare Studies. (2017). Armed groups and ceasefire arrangements in Northeast India. New Delhi: CLAWS.
Baruah, S. (2005). Durable disorder: Understanding the politics of Northeast India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Baruah, S. (2020). In the name of the nation: India and its Northeast. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Hazarika, S. (1994). Strangers of the mist: Tales of war and peace from India’s Northeast. New Delhi: Penguin Books.
Misra, U. (2014). India’s Northeast: Identity movements, state formation, and challenges of peace building. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Samaddar, R. (Ed.). (2016). The politics of autonomy in Northeast India. London: Routledge.
The Hindu. (2023, May 15). Explained: Suspension of Operations agreements with Kuki groups in Manipur. Chennai: The Hindu Group.
The Indian Express. (2023, June 2). What are SoO agreements and why they matter in Manipur conflict. New Delhi: Indian Express Group.
Hindustan Times. (2022, September 1). Centre extends SoO pact with Kuki insurgent groups. New Delhi: HT Media.
The Telegraph. (2023, July 10). Debate over stipends and SoO camps in Manipur. Kolkata: ABP Group.
Scroll.in. (2023, August 5). Inside the ceasefire: How SoO camps function in Northeast India. Mumbai: Scroll Media.
South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2024). Insurgency database: Northeast India. New Delhi: Institute for Conflict Management. Retrieved from https://www.satp.org
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. (2023). Conflict trends in Northeast India. Madison, WI: ACLED.
Institute for Conflict Management. (2022). Annual security report: Insurgency in Northeast India. New Delhi: ICM.

🧾 Notes on Using the References

Cadre strength (KNO–UPF ranges): Usually drawn from Manipur Assembly replies, MHA reports, and media triangulation.
Stipend figures: Reported in Assembly questions, Home Department briefs, and ground-rule annexures.
SoO mechanisms: Best sourced from 2008 Ground Rules + subsequent extensions.

Pages

Feb 8, 2026

Stipends, Ceasefires, and the Contradiction of Separate Administration Demands