Introduction: The end of long‐standing authoritarianism in the late twentieth century provoked a global resurgence of civil society in the Third World that has driven scholars increasingly to ask how revitalized social movements impact democratic progress. Despite daunting theoretical and methodological problems in studying movement outcomes, and disparate historical and social conditions producing diverse, contending views of movement effects, institutionalization of movements is a major, though not sole, mechanism for consolidating and advancing democracy. Movement institutionalization requires a particular melding of movement organization characteristics and favorable political opportunities that vary widely by time and context. This institutionalization of civil resurgence is lacking in the hills of Manipur.
In the life of nations living under a despotic dispensation, there comes a moment when all the suppressed classes of society, along with liberal forces, rise up against the system in an attempt to replace it with a just and egalitarian one.
Resurgence of Manipur Indigenous Group
The indigenous group of Manipur, comprising five districts, have been affected by different brands of militancy who initially aims at resurging from the oppressor. The resurgent related activity of Civil Society was borne out of people unmet needs; un empowerment, unemployment, illiteracy, ill-health, landlessness, lack of livelihood opportunities, marginalization of the people and step-motherly treatment in terms of development of the region by the government. Movement against government’s indifference was initially started with a civil movement, knocking at the doors of the governing body of the state where their agonies and prayers were unheard. This is the main cause of the civil society started to pick up arms.
Democratic Agitation to Armed Agitation
Insurgency came to Manipur hill areas with the Naga underground in 1956. The ‘Federal Government of Nagaland’ (FGN) extended its activities to the Naga districts of Manipur as substantial part of which is claimed by the Isak-Muivah faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) as part of Nagalim, the proposed unified territory of the Nagas as claimed by the Naga rebels.
The Chin-Kuki-Mizo ethnic groups in the early 1980s initiated their own brand of insurgency. Within a short span of time a number of Kuki outfits were formed. Several other tribes, such as the Paite, Vaiphei, Hmars and Zou have also established their own armed groups.
Failed Resurgence
The cumulative impact of the activities by the various militant groups has been a breakdown in law and order and the administrative machinery of the state. Large proportions of the State's resources are both directly and indirectly siphoned out by the militants' extortion campaigns, even as the delivery mechanisms for the developmental and relief services of the State collapse, bringing planned developmental activities to a standstill. Over the years, Government departments in Manipur have regularly paid out a fixed percentage of their revenues to various militant groups. Further, the militants also directly interfere in the award of Government contracts and execution of developmental projects, which essentially are reduced to largesse that they come to control, rather than projects to be executed on the ground. In such an environment of rampant extortion, compounded by widespread corruption at every level of the State administration, development activities have languished. Basic infrastructure facilities like roads, communications, health care and education, all show visible signs of decline. The situation has reached a stage where government employees have begun to protest the state's inability to protect them in the course of their duties. The militant groups are also issuing diktats on social and cultural issues in order to show up the administrative machinery as irrelevant and ineffectual.
Przeworski (1991, 1995) rightly said that conversion of democratic movement to an insurgency is the stumbling block for civil resurgence; this is absolutely true to every armed agitation. This is the start of straying from the part of resurgence.
Factors that sustained Insurgency
Peace initiative by the Government of India ever since the insurgency began - failed to bring any negotiated settlement due to many factors such as:
·Failure of the national leadership in constitutional and cultural integration of the various ethnic groups of isolated northeast with the rest of diverse Indian society.
·Multiplicity of insurgent organisations.
·Top leaders of prominent insurgent groups are seldom interested in negotiated peace as "their children study in the best schools abroad and their family live in luxury" (Insurgency or Ethnic Conflict by S.C.Sharma, 2000, page215).
·Obstacle by Drug Traffickers, who control huge amount of underground economy with their money-spinning strength. Return of normalcy will hamper their unlawful business.
·Higher levels of corruption in State agencies, which are responsible for utilisation of substantial fund allocated by the centre for developmental programmes. Central Government has been bearing about 90% of the state budget but economic and industrial development is negligible.
·Negligible benefit to the common people through developmental programmes alienated them from the centre.
·Connivance between corrupts officials and the insurgents created underground economy under the control of the secessionists.
·It is alleged that the insurgent organisations collect monthly donations from government employees. "Going by the sources, the collection of money by various underground groups was nearly 100 crores of rupees a year" (Bleeding Manipur by Phanjoubam Tarapot, Har Anand Publication, New Delhi, 2003, page 54).
·Prolonged stay of security forces in the region has annoyed the people.
·Poor generation of employment opportunity for educated youths.
·Constant external support to all the insurgent groups.
·Liberalised trans-border movements with weak neighbours like Burma and Bangladesh wherefrom the insurgents operate conveniently.
·Political leadership at centre has failed to instil confidence among the natives regarding its peace initiative since 1997. The on going peace-talk with NSCN (I/M) has aggravated their apprehension that the government might concede the demand of underground Naga militants for ‘Nagalim’(Greater Nagaland) by unification of Nagaland with the Naga majority areas of Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar.
·Non-Naga populations of Manipur do not like the idea of any territorial division of Manipur. Ever since the peace initiative by the government with a selected group of insurgents (NSCN-I/M) they organized protest rallies time to time. A huge rally of over five lakh people in the state capital Imphal on 1st August 1997 under the banner of All Manipur United Club Organisation (AIMUCO), a non-political body appeared to be a mass upsurge to oppose any such attempt. Similar rally was also organized in September 2000 as well as in June 2001.
The Remedial with respect to Model of Community Organisation
The problem of militancy is the result of administrative centralisation and unequal distribution of authority and developmental works in a state or a country in general.
The problem in Manipur’s militancy related, especially in the hill areas could be tackle with the model of locality development through local leadership to initiate the development programs. It is due to the absent of local initiative in the hill areas for the past several decades which leads to establishment of several insurgent groups with the purpose of liberating from the unreachable state government. Had the MDC/ADC does not defunct for several decades in Manipur hill areas, the present situation of problems could be avoided as the local body i.e. the MDC/ADC could be the voice of the local which represent the hill people at local level.
Lack of social planning or policy also lead to increase in insurgency related activities in the state. In the matter of administrative reform, narrowing the gap between government and people could be possible if a mechanism be invented that would ensure people's participation in government and politics. Ventilation of public grievances and open discussions in the matter pertaining to public interest that would account for vibrant working of democracy will find congenial atmosphere, mini Assemblies be introduced in all the constituencies located at places convenient for all. Matters of importance seldom get off the ground of the Assembly owing to the lack of the degree of awareness of the general public/ mass. Confining at the capital of the state by the MLAs / MPs away from the constituencies busying themselves elsewhere that often made them forget the representative character-a prerequisite of popular Government, will simply arrest the functioning and progress of democracy.
Conclusion
Although civil society vigour increases as revitalized popular protest both instigates and results from the retreat of authoritarianism and beginning of democratic transition, democratization is integrative - rather than unilateral as game‐theorists propose shaped both by popular demand from below as well as by negotiations among power elites from above (Collier, 1999).
1.Giugni, Marco G. 1998. “Introduction: Social Movements and Change: Incorporation, Transformation, and Democratization.” Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds., From Contention to Democracy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
In 1789, such a moment, a defining moment, came in France when the Third Estate (middle class and peasants) revolted against the tyrannical rule of Louis XVI, stormed and seized Bastille, the symbol of despotism, and finally the assembly drafted a new constitution that introduced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, proclaiming liberty, equality, and fraternity. In Russia, the regime of Nicholas II, the last Tsar, was dethroned in 1917 by the workers and peasants who put an end to the unjust order. In modern times, the Iranian people raised up against the tyrannical the regime of the Shah of Iran and deposed him in February 1979.
The Government cannot close its eyes at the perspective n the development of civil society in India from colonial to post-colonial and then to the present day India. Today, we see a wide variety of activities being undertaken by civil society, though all such activities do not lead to empowerment of those who need it. In India, a resurgent Civil Society was borne out of people unmet needs; un empowerment, unemployment, illiteracy, ill-health, landlessness, lack of livelihood opportunities - all of which continue to be the strong shackles binding the poor people to poverty even after sixty two years of India’s independence. Thus, the civil society has been gaining its strength and getting its voice from the failures and pitfalls of the Government from time to time. It is true that while civil society activity has grown greatly it is tragic that there is no proof of real mass movement or mass empowerment taking place in India today. In some sense, it is the failure of civil society in which some wolves have entered in sheep’s clothes and started spoiling the field of civil society movement. This is the important factor that leads to civil resurgence in the northeast in general and Manipur in general.
Resurgence of Manipur Indigenous Group
The indigenous group of Manipur, comprising five districts, have been affected by different brands of militancy who initially aims at resurging from the oppressor. The resurgent related activity of Civil Society was borne out of people unmet needs; un empowerment, unemployment, illiteracy, ill-health, landlessness, lack of livelihood opportunities, marginalization of the people and step-motherly treatment in terms of development of the region by the government. Movement against government’s indifference was initially started with a civil movement, knocking at the doors of the governing body of the state where their agonies and prayers were unheard. This is the main cause of the civil society started to pick up arms.
Democratic Agitation to Armed Agitation
Insurgency came to Manipur hill areas with the Naga underground in 1956. The ‘Federal Government of Nagaland’ (FGN) extended its activities to the Naga districts of Manipur as substantial part of which is claimed by the Isak-Muivah faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) as part of Nagalim, the proposed unified territory of the Nagas as claimed by the Naga rebels.
The Chin-Kuki-Mizo ethnic groups in the early 1980s initiated their own brand of insurgency. Within a short span of time a number of Kuki outfits were formed. Several other tribes, such as the Paite, Vaiphei, Hmars and Zou have also established their own armed groups.
Failed Resurgence
The cumulative impact of the activities by the various militant groups has been a breakdown in law and order and the administrative machinery of the state. Large proportions of the State's resources are both directly and indirectly siphoned out by the militants' extortion campaigns, even as the delivery mechanisms for the developmental and relief services of the State collapse, bringing planned developmental activities to a standstill. Over the years, Government departments in Manipur have regularly paid out a fixed percentage of their revenues to various militant groups. Further, the militants also directly interfere in the award of Government contracts and execution of developmental projects, which essentially are reduced to largesse that they come to control, rather than projects to be executed on the ground. In such an environment of rampant extortion, compounded by widespread corruption at every level of the State administration, development activities have languished. Basic infrastructure facilities like roads, communications, health care and education, all show visible signs of decline. The situation has reached a stage where government employees have begun to protest the state's inability to protect them in the course of their duties. The militant groups are also issuing diktats on social and cultural issues in order to show up the administrative machinery as irrelevant and ineffectual.
Przeworski (1991, 1995) rightly said that conversion of democratic movement to an insurgency is the stumbling block for civil resurgence; this is absolutely true to every armed agitation. This is the start of straying from the part of resurgence.
Factors that sustained Insurgency
Peace initiative by the Government of India ever since the insurgency began - failed to bring any negotiated settlement due to many factors such as:
·Failure of the national leadership in constitutional and cultural integration of the various ethnic groups of isolated northeast with the rest of diverse Indian society.
·Multiplicity of insurgent organisations.
·Top leaders of prominent insurgent groups are seldom interested in negotiated peace as "their children study in the best schools abroad and their family live in luxury" (Insurgency or Ethnic Conflict by S.C.Sharma, 2000, page215).
·Obstacle by Drug Traffickers, who control huge amount of underground economy with their money-spinning strength. Return of normalcy will hamper their unlawful business.
·Higher levels of corruption in State agencies, which are responsible for utilisation of substantial fund allocated by the centre for developmental programmes. Central Government has been bearing about 90% of the state budget but economic and industrial development is negligible.
·Negligible benefit to the common people through developmental programmes alienated them from the centre.
·Connivance between corrupts officials and the insurgents created underground economy under the control of the secessionists.
·It is alleged that the insurgent organisations collect monthly donations from government employees. "Going by the sources, the collection of money by various underground groups was nearly 100 crores of rupees a year" (Bleeding Manipur by Phanjoubam Tarapot, Har Anand Publication, New Delhi, 2003, page 54).
·Prolonged stay of security forces in the region has annoyed the people.
·Poor generation of employment opportunity for educated youths.
·Constant external support to all the insurgent groups.
·Liberalised trans-border movements with weak neighbours like Burma and Bangladesh wherefrom the insurgents operate conveniently.
·Political leadership at centre has failed to instil confidence among the natives regarding its peace initiative since 1997. The on going peace-talk with NSCN (I/M) has aggravated their apprehension that the government might concede the demand of underground Naga militants for ‘Nagalim’(Greater Nagaland) by unification of Nagaland with the Naga majority areas of Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar.
·Non-Naga populations of Manipur do not like the idea of any territorial division of Manipur. Ever since the peace initiative by the government with a selected group of insurgents (NSCN-I/M) they organized protest rallies time to time. A huge rally of over five lakh people in the state capital Imphal on 1st August 1997 under the banner of All Manipur United Club Organisation (AIMUCO), a non-political body appeared to be a mass upsurge to oppose any such attempt. Similar rally was also organized in September 2000 as well as in June 2001.
The Remedial with respect to Model of Community Organisation
The problem of militancy is the result of administrative centralisation and unequal distribution of authority and developmental works in a state or a country in general.
The problem in Manipur’s militancy related, especially in the hill areas could be tackle with the model of locality development through local leadership to initiate the development programs. It is due to the absent of local initiative in the hill areas for the past several decades which leads to establishment of several insurgent groups with the purpose of liberating from the unreachable state government. Had the MDC/ADC does not defunct for several decades in Manipur hill areas, the present situation of problems could be avoided as the local body i.e. the MDC/ADC could be the voice of the local which represent the hill people at local level.
Lack of social planning or policy also lead to increase in insurgency related activities in the state. In the matter of administrative reform, narrowing the gap between government and people could be possible if a mechanism be invented that would ensure people's participation in government and politics. Ventilation of public grievances and open discussions in the matter pertaining to public interest that would account for vibrant working of democracy will find congenial atmosphere, mini Assemblies be introduced in all the constituencies located at places convenient for all. Matters of importance seldom get off the ground of the Assembly owing to the lack of the degree of awareness of the general public/ mass. Confining at the capital of the state by the MLAs / MPs away from the constituencies busying themselves elsewhere that often made them forget the representative character-a prerequisite of popular Government, will simply arrest the functioning and progress of democracy.
Conclusion
Although civil society vigour increases as revitalized popular protest both instigates and results from the retreat of authoritarianism and beginning of democratic transition, democratization is integrative - rather than unilateral as game‐theorists propose shaped both by popular demand from below as well as by negotiations among power elites from above (Collier, 1999).
It can be argued with considerable conviction that the origin of militancy in north-eastern India's Manipur state is linked to the sense of popular alienation, mostly arising out of New Delhi's delayed decision to grant statehood 23 years after the State decided to merge with the country. At the same time, there are no doubts that the militant outfits are today a pale shadow of the groupings that had actually originated to protect the State's interest. Separatist movements in Manipur today do not seem to represent the people of the State or their interests. Most of the rebel groups have shown signs of having been transformed into criminalized entities mostly engaged in activities that benefit none except for the outfits themselves.
Among several characteristics of civil society that can influence its impact on political democratization, this article focuses on its institutionalization or lack thereof. Institutionalization is not inevitable in the course of social movement trajectories (Przeworski, 1991; Tarrow, 1994). It occurs only when both social movement leaders and members jointly seek to enter the institutional political arena and political elites stand ready to accept them. This is the very reason, that there is no institutionalization of the movement between the armed group and the civil society, the social movement is a failure.
References
1.Giugni, Marco G. 1998. “Introduction: Social Movements and Change: Incorporation, Transformation, and Democratization.” Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds., From Contention to Democracy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
2.http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/289B530DA501D730C1256C05002E1236?opendocument
3.http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/armed_forces_special_powers_act1958.pdf
4.http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/Armed%20forces%20_J&K_%20Spl.%20powers%20act,%201990.pdf
5.Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
6.(Indian Ministry of Law and Justice Published by the Authority of New Delhi)
7.Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 109.
8.Code of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter ‘CrPC’], 1973, Section 197, available at: http://www.vakilno1.com/bareacts/CrPc/s197.htm
9.http://www.e-pao.net/epRelatedNews.asp?heading=1&src=120704 "Arrested woman found brutally killed" July 11, 2004
10.Melucci, Alberto. 1989. Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
11.www.gijc2008.no/handouts/380/Handout-Kavita_Joshi.doc [Shooting Women and Conflict in Manipur, India "TALES FROM THE MARGINS"documentary film and presentation by Kavita Joshi]
12.http://www.asthabharati.org/Dia_Oct%2009/E.N.%20Ram.htm
13.http://zolengthe.net/2008/09/02/zdv-c-in-c-pu-kamkhanpao-toh-houlimna/
14.http://www.asthabharati.org/Dia_Oct%2009/E.N.%20Ram.htm
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